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1  For journalistic accounts of the Enron fiasco and the various explanations for it, see BETHANY MCLEAN &
PETER ELKIND , THE SMARTEST GUYS IN THE ROOM :  THE AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON (2003);
LOREN FOX, ENRON:  THE RISE AND FALL (2003); M IMI SWA RTZ &  SHERRON WATKINS, POWER FAILURE:  THE INSIDE
STORY OF THE COLLAPSE O F ENRON (2003).  For reports of official investigations, see the First, Second, and Third
Interim Reports and the [Fourth and] Final Report of Neal Batson, Court-Appointed Examiner (dated Sept. 21, 2002;
Jan. 21, 2003, June 30, 2003, and Nov. 4, 2003, respectively) [hereinafter “First, Second, Third, and Fourth Batson
Report,” respectively]; Report of the Special Investigative Committee of the Board of Directors of Enron Corp. (Feb.
1, 2002) [hereinafter “Powers Report”]; Report of the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee
on Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, The Role of the Board of Directors in Enron’s Collapse, 107th Cong., Report
107-70 (July 8, 2002) [hereinafter “Senate Investigations Subcommittee Report”].  All of these documents are
available on-line, from various sources including the FindLaw library of Enron-related documents,
<http://news.findlaw.com/legalnews/lit/enron/#documents> (visited 12/9/03), the e-Law repository of documents
from U.S. bankruptcy court, <http://bank.elaw.com> (visited 12/9/03), or from Enron’s own website,
<http://www.enron.com/corp/por/supporting.html> (visited 12/9/03).  For scholarly analysis, see John C. Coffee, Jr.,
What Caused Enron?  A Capsule Social and Economic History of the 1990s, 89 COR NE LL L. REV. 269 (2004)
[hereinafter, “Coffee, What Caused Enron”]; E. Norman Veasey, Corporate Governance and  Ethics in a Post-
Enron/Worldcom Environment,  72 U. CIN . L. REV. 731 (2004); Symposium, Crisis in Confidence:  Corporate
Governance and Professional Ethics Post-Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 915 (2003); Symposium, On Enron, Worldcom,
and  Their Aftermath , 27 VT. L. REV. 817 (2003); Symposium, Lessons from Enron:  How Did Corporate and
Securities Law Fail?, 48 VILL. L. REV. 989 (2003); Symposium, Lessons from  Enron:  A Symposium on Corporate
Governance, 54 MERCER L. REV. 663 (2003); Douglas G . Baird & Robert K . Rasmussen, Four (or Five) Easy
Lessons from Enron, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1787 (2002); Symposium, Enron:  Lessons and Implications, 8 STAN. J. L.
BUS. &  FIN . 1 (2002); William W . Bratton, Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1275
(2002) [hereinafter, “Bratton, Dark Side”]; Jeffrey N. Gordon, What Enron Means for the Management and Control
of the Modern Business Corporation:  Some Initial Reflections,  69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1233 (2002);  Steven  L.
Schwarcz, Enron and the Use and Abuse of Special Purpose Entities in Corporate Structures,  70 U. CIN . L. REV.
1309 (2002) [hereinafter, “Schwarcz, Use and Abuse”]. 
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I. Introduction and Overview of the Argument.  
After any significant corporate scandal, expect lawyers to be blamed.  In the case of the
collapse of Enron, there is plenty of blame to go around.1  The board of directors failed to
exercise effective oversight; some corporate officers engaged in blatant self-dealing while others
overlooked obvious conflicts of interest; investors and corporate officers unduly emphasized
short-term earnings at the expense of the long-term viability of businesses, partially because of
the importance of equity-based compensation for senior management; in-house and retained
accountants blessed the dubious accounting treatment of multiple transactions; in addition to
engaging in outright malfeasance, the company made some lousy business decisions, such as
2  See FOX, supra  note 1, at 193-95, 241, 269 (analysts acting as cheerleaders because of conflicts);
MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1 , at 317-18, 324 (Andersen’s independence compromised); Coffee, What Caused
Enron, supra  note 1, at 292 (explaining SEC disclosure requirements for firing auditor vs. firing consulting firm,
which further compromised auditor independence); Fox, supra  note 1, at 241-43 (credulity of investors, illustrated
by hedge fund managers who saw red flags in Enron’s accounting and sold  its stock short); SWA RTZ &  WATKINS,
supra  note 1, at xi-xiii, 331 (credulity of investors, illustrated by Houston financial advisor who did not recommend
Enron stock because he couldn’t make sense of its financial statements and Warren Buffet’s statement that he never
understood how Enron made money); Baird & Rasmussen, supra  note 1, at 1809 (investors failed to understand that
Enron’s business model was vulnerable to competition); FOX, supra  note 1, at 195 (dot-com “bubble” of unjustified
optimism by investors); MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1, at 231-33, 299 (during the late 1990’s bull market
analysts and investors were obsessed with short-term earnings targets and  prone to hype); Bratton, Dark Side, supra
note 1 , at 1283-84 (maximizing shareholder value has come to mean fixation on short-term numbers); Coffee, What
Caused Enron, supra  note 1, at 293-95 (noting that gatekeepers’ reputational capital is less valuable in a market
bubble); Fox, supra  note 1, at 211-13, 229-30 (Arthur Andersen’s acquiescence in SPE transactions); Powers
Report, supra  note 1, at 5, 24-25 (same); FOX, supra  note 1, at 123-27, 151-56, 160, 228 (self-dealing by Andrew
Fastow and Michael Kopper); Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 7-9, 16, 18 , 26 (same); M CLEAN &  ELKIND , supra
note 1 , at 196-211 (same); id. at 190 (Andersen’s skepticism about Enron dealing with private investment funds
controlled by Fastow); Fourth Batson Report, supra  note 1, at 58-59 (Fastow’s personal dealing and failure by Lay
and Skilling to inquire); FOX, supra  note 1 , at 169 , 176 (Kenneth Lay’s “hands-off” management style); but see
Fourth Batson Report, supra  note 1 , at 57-58 (Lay was actively engaged in monitoring); FOX, supra  note 1, at 158-
59, 309 (inattention of board); but see Powers Report, supra  note 1, at 9 (board’s approval of LJM transactions was
with knowledge of conflicts of interest); Senate Investigations Subcommittee Report, supra  note 1, at 11-15 (claims
of ignorance of board members not borne out by evidence, but board may have been unduly deferential to corporate
officers); MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1, at 126-27, 227-28 (Enron was obsessed with booking earnings,
particularly through mark-to-market accounting, but wasn’t particularly concerned  about cash flow); FOX, supra  note
1, at 281-82 (Lay conceding that certain investments had performed poorly and the company had accumulated a
great deal of debt); M CLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1, at xxiv (Skilling admitting that the broadband venture, which
lost $1  billion, was a bad idea); id. at 225-27 (bad investments and  management in trading business); FOX, supra
note 1, at 307 (investing in bandwidth trading was a terrible idea in light of overcapacity in telecommunications
industry); Baird & Rasmussen, supra  note 1, at 1798-99 (Enron was a “toxic” combination of market-making and
venture capital businesses). 
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investing in broadband capacity when there was already an oversupply; many Wall Street
analysts were too busy trying to drum up business for their investment banker employers to
exercise objective judgment; Enron’s auditor’s independence was compromised by the massive
fees it earned from the client, and from cross-selling consulting services; and investors were so
besotted with “new economy” hype that they failed to use common sense when investing in
companies with no obvious way of making money.2  Even with this apparent surfeit of careless or
malevolent actors, however, the legal profession should expect to be called upon to justify the
role of lawyers in the transactions that ultimately proved to be Enron’s undoing.  Lawyers played
3  For the size of the restatements, charges against earnings, and reductions in shareholder equity, see
Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 2-3; Second Batson Report, supra  note 1, at 6-9.  For the unraveling of SPE
transactions, see Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note 1 , at 1310-11.  For the  reluctance of others to  trade with
Enron and the resulting crisis in cash flow, see FOX, supra  note 1 , at 264 , 268; SWA RTZ &  WATKINS, supra  note 1, at
328-32; M CLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1 , at 236 , 378-80; Bratton, Dark Side, supra  note 1, at 1310.
4  See Second Batson Report, supra  note 1 , at 5 n.8 (pre-bankruptcy size  of Enron); Fourth Batson Report,
supra  note 1 , at 114  (attorneys provided  essential role in closing transactions).  
5  Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. W all, 743  F. Supp. 901, 920 (D.D.C. 1990); see also  Susan P. Koniak,
Testimony, Where Were the Lawyers?  Behind the Curtain Wearing Their Magic Caps, in Accountability Issues: 
Lessons Learned from Enron’s Fall — Senate Judiciary Committee Hearing (Feb. 6, 2002) (ironically echoing Judge
Sporkin’s question).
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a substantial role in every one of the transactions that were ultimately restated in October 2001,
by advising their client, documenting the deals, and certifying their compliance with various legal
requirements.  When Enron announced that it was taking hundreds of millions of dollars of
charges against earnings, and announced that it was reducing shareholders’ equity by over a
billion dollars, its trading business collapsed as counterparties refused to deal with the company
on credit.3  Lawyers were the but-for cause of these restatements of earnings, and therefore of the
subsequent failure of what was once the seventh largest publicly traded company in the United
States, because the transactions could not have closed in their original form without the
approvals of lawyers.4  The pressing question for the legal profession is whether they were
additionally the responsible cause, in the sense of bearing moral blameworthiness for approving
the transactions that ultimately had to be restated.  
When the last scandal of this magnitude — the savings and loan crisis of the 1980’s —
became widely known, a federal judge famously asked “Where were the lawyers?”5  Judge
Sporkin’s cri de coeur has become a convenient shorthand used by scholars of the legal
profession who believe, as I do, that lawyers have failed to take seriously their responsibility as
6  Susan P. Koniak, When the Hurlyburly’s Done:  The Bar’s Struggle with the SEC, 103 COLUM . L. REV.
1236, 1237 (2003) (“the lawyers have, however, largely escaped responsibility for their role in this nation’s latest
spate of corporate fraud”).
7  See BARBARA LEY TOFFLER &  JENNIFER REING OLD , FINAL ACCOUNTING:  AMBITION , GREED, AND THE
FALL OF ARTHUR ANDERSEN  221-22 (2003); MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1 , at 406-07.  
8  Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra  note 1 , at 278 ; see also  Donald C . Langevoort, The Organizational
Psychology of Hyper-Competition:  Corporate Irresponsibility and the Lessons of Enron, 70 GEO . WASH . L. REV.
968 (2002) (discussing cognitive psychological research on the production of firm cultures that tend to create a
disposition on the part of managers to block out distracting concerns, like ethical issues); Bratton, Dark Side, supra
note 1, at 1329-32 (arguing that the most plausible story of Enron’s fall requires understanding the workplace
“tournament” culture, which created a bias toward winning and an inability to perceive reality accurately).
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professionals while representing wealthy corporate clients.  It may be the case that lawyers have
not yet been subjected to the kind of grilling at the hands of Congressional investigators that
officers like Lay and Skilling had to endure,6 and certainly no law firm has suffered the fate of
Enron’s auditor, Arthur Andersen, which was convicted of obstruction of justice for attempting
to thwart an SEC investigation.7  Nevertheless, it is appropriate to ask the hard questions about
the role of lawyers in the most recent wave of corporate scandals.  This Article is not a polemic
against the rotten state of lawyers’ ethics.  It is probably true to some extent that “[p]erverse
incentives, not declines in ethics, cause scandals.”8  When it comes to the role of lawyers,
however, it is impossible to talk about incentives — perverse or otherwise — without having a
very clear jurisprudential understanding of how lawyers ought to apply and interpret complex,
ambiguous legal norms to their clients’ transactions.  In particular, we ought to investigate the
responsibility of lawyers, acting in their capacity of representatives of clients, vis-à-vis the
maintenance of a stable framework of legal norms.  Do lawyers have any such responsibility, or
may they take a merely instrumental stance toward the law, treating it as something that may be
evaded or nullified through careful planning?  If the technical requirements of law can be evaded
to the client’s benefit and the detriment of others, is there anything in the lawyer’s role that
9  A reader may be forgiven for thinking that we need another defense of professionalism like she needs a
hole in the head.  Certainly the rhetoric of professionalism is a cliché in the self-justifying discourse of the legal
profession and in academic criticism of the conduct of the bar.  Professionalism is a word that has been used by so
many different theorists, for so many different purposes, that it is almost devoid of meaning.  For example,
sociologists and economists in a debunking mode observe the tendency of the organized body of lawyers to erect
barriers to entry and consolidate its control over the provision of anything that could conceivably be called legal
services, in order to enjoy monopoly rents.  See, e.g., ELLIOTT A. KRAUSE , DEATH OF THE GUILDS:  PROFESSIONS,
STATES, AND THE ADVA NCE O F CAPITALISM , 1930  TO THE PRESENT (1996); RICHARD A. POSNER , OVERCOMING LAW
39-60 (1996); RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 17-30 (1989).  Idealistic critics of lawyers contrast
professionalism with the profit motive, and castigate greedy lawyers for ruining a  formerly honorable pursuit.  See,
e.g., RUDOLPH J. GERBER, LAWYERS, COURTS , AND PR O FE SS IO N ALIS M  23  (1989) (“Today we have lost the ab ility to
distinguish between a calling and a station in life, to see differences between a profession and a trade.  To the extent
that law students and lawyers become absorbed in status and gain, law ceases to be a profession . . ..”); Tom C.
Clark, Teaching Professional Ethics, 12 SAN D IEGO L. REV. 249, 251 (1975) (“the primacy of service over profit is
the criterion which distinguishes a profession from a business”).  A more positive notion of professionalism, drawing
from the work of sociologists such as Emelie Durkheim and  Talcott Parsons as well as from the legal theory of Louis
D. Brandeis, emphasizes the lawyer’s independence from the client and imagines the lawyer as a mediator between
the client’s and the public’s interests.  See, e.g., Robert L. Nelson & David M . Trubek, Arenas of Professionalism:
The Professional Ideologies of Lawyers in Context, in LAWYERS’ IDE ALS /LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS
IN THE AMERICAN LEGA L PROFESSION  180 (Robert L. Nelson, et al., eds., 1992); Robert W. Gordon & William H.
Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in id. at 215; W illiam H. Simon, Babbitt v. Brandeis:  The Decline of
the Professional Ideal, 37 STAN. L. REV. 565 (1985).  This latter definition approximates the conception of
professionalism that I will defend here.  
10  Compare the principle of dynamic statutory interpretation, which requires an interpreter to construe a text
“in light of [its] present social, political, and legal context.”  William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479 (1987) [hereinafter, “Eskridge, Dynam ic”].  It is also similar to the principle of
purposivism, familiar in legal ethics from the work of William Simon and David W ilkins.  See David B. W ilkins,
Legal Realism for Lawyers, 104 HARV. L. REV. 468, 505-15 (1990); William H. Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy,
1978 W IS. L. REV. 29, 62.  Differences with these approaches will be apparent in the application of the attitude of
professionalism to cases.  
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prohibits her from assisting the client?  
In this Article, I wish to defend what I call the interpretive attitude of professionalism.9 
In short, professionalism is a stance toward the law which accepts that a lawyer is not simply an
agent of her client (although the lawyer-client relationship is obviously governed by the law of
agency).  Rather, in carrying out her client’s lawful instructions, a lawyer has an obligation to
apply the law to her client’s situation with due regard to the substantive meaning of legal norms,
not merely their formal expression.10  In addition, a professional lawyer must respect the
11  For a  more elaborate defense of this position, see W . Bradley W endel, Civil Obedience, 104 COLUM . L.
REV. 363 (2004).  
12  See STEVEN J. BURTON, JUDGING IN GOOD FAITH  17, 35-37, and passim  (1992); Thomas D. Morgan &
Robert W . Tuttle, Legal Representation in a  Pluralist Society, 63 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 984 (1995); Robert W.
Gordon, A New Role for Lawyers?:  The Corporate Counselor After Enron, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1185, 1200 (2003)
[hereinafter, “Gordon, New Role”] (“[T]here is a difference between trying to game and manipulate a system as a
resistance movement or alienated outsider would, and to engage in a committed and good faith struggle within the
system to influence it to fulfill what a good faith interpreter would construe as its best values and  purposes.”).  
13  See Robert W . Gordon, A Collective Failure of Nerve:  The Bar’s Response to Kaye Scholer, 23 LA W  &
SOC. INQUIRY 315 (1998) (“Lawyers have, I think, fallen into the habit of thinking that maintaining the integrity of
the legal framework is always someone else’s problem . . ..  But, of course, the order of rules and norms, policies and
procedures, and institutional actors and roles that make up the legal system . . . is only as effective as voluntary
compliance can make it; for if people routinely start running red lights when they think no cop is watching (or hire
lawyers to keep a lookout for the cops, and to exhaust the resources of traffic courts arguing the lights were green),
the regime will collapse.”).  The obligation on the part of lawyers to maintain the institution of law can be
understood as an instance of the Rawlsian natural duty to support just institutions.  See JOHN RAW LS, A  THEORY OF
JUSTICE 114-17, 333-37 (1971).  For a defense of the Rawlsian position, which is sometimes thought to be less
plausible than it is, see Jeremy W aldron, Special Ties and Natural Duties, 22 PHIL. &  PUB. AFF. 3 (1993).
14  JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND D ISAGREEMENT 101  (1999).  
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achievement represented by law, which is the final settlement of contested issues (both factual
and normative) with a view toward enabling coordinated action in a highly complex, pluralistic
society.  This obligation of respect means that a lawyer must treat legal norms as preclusive of
the moral and other reasons that would otherwise justify or require a different action in the
circumstances.11  We can call this the negative aspect of the attitude of professionalism, which
has a further, positive, aspect.  The positive aspect is the demand that a lawyer should take a
certain attitude toward the law, manifesting her recognition that the law is worthy of being taken
seriously, interpreted in good faith with due regard to its substantive meaning, and not simply
seen as an obstacle standing in the way of the client’s goals.12  Law is an achievement, but not
one that will persist without custodians and defenders.  It is the job of lawyers to maintain this
institution in good working order, instead of subverting it.13  As Jeremy Waldron puts it, any
attempt to circumvent the law should be accompanied by feelings of distaste and dishonor,14 not
15  See FOX, supra  note 1 , at 259 ; Jill E. Fisch & K enneth M. Rosen, Is There a Role for Lawyers in
Preven ting Future Enrons? , 48 VILL. L. REV. 1097, 1115 (2003).  Sherron Watkins was a vice-president for
corporate development in the finance department of Enron at the time she wrote a letter to Kenneth Lay warning that
the company might “implode in a wave of accounting scandals.”  See FOX, supra  note 1, at 247-48; Fourth Batson
Report, supra  note 1, App. C at 159-61.  The complete Watkins letter is available on-line from numerous sites,
including FindLaw, and is included  as an appendix to  her book.  See Letter Purportedly From Enron Employee
Sherron W atkins Sent To Enron Chairman and C .E.O. Kenneth Lay Re: Enron Accounting Practices, in SWA RTZ &
WATKINS, supra  note 1, at 361-62;  <http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/enron/empltr2lay82001.pdf> (visited
12/9 /03).    
16  Roger C. Cramton, Enron and the Corporate Lawyer:  A Primer on Legal and Ethical Issues, 58 BUS.
LAW . 143  (2002); Fourth Batson Report, supra  note 1 , at 50 &  App. C at 161-66; Powers Report, supra  note 1, at
176-77 (“The result of the V&E review was largely predetermined by the scope and nature of the investigation and
the process employed . . . .  The scope and process of the investigation appear to have been structured with less
skepticism than was needed to see through these particularly complex transactions.”). 
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pride for having defeated something that is regarded as an adversary.  In addition, respect for the
law demands that lawyers be able to provide public, reasoned justification for an interpretation of
legal texts — one which is plausible in light of the underlying purposes of the statutes, rules, or
cases.  
Professionalism stands in opposition to the view of many lawyers that excellence in
lawyering means engaging in “creative and aggressive” structuring of transactions for the benefit
of clients, even though the transactions are set up to evade regulatory requirements for the
protection of investors.  The quoted language, “creative and aggressive,” which is often used by
lawyers as a term of approbation, comes from the report issued by Enron’s long-time outside
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, in response to the concerns raised by Sherron Watkins.15  The firm,
investigating transactions its own lawyers had worked on, despite the glaring conflicts of
interest,16 determined that the only problem with the structure and accounting treatment of the
transactions was potentially one of public relations.  The subtext of this response was that
creativity and aggressiveness is a positive value in sophisticated business counsel.  Interestingly,
17  See Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 4-5 (stating committee’s conclusion that certain related-party
transactions lacked economic substance and were entered into  solely for the purpose of manipulating Enron’s
financial statements).  
18  See William W . Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting:  Rules Versus Principles Versus
Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1044  (2003) (distinguishing regulatory arbitrage from strategic noncompliance, and
defining the latter as “action under an interpretation of the law in conflict with the stated interpretation of the
regulator”).  
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Watkins’ letter itself used the word “aggressive” to describe the company’s accounting, but the
word had a decidedly more negative connotation for her — suggesting that Enron had used
smoke and mirrors to obscure the economic substance of transactions to the point that the
accounting treatment was no longer reliable.17  The concluding section of this Article will
therefore be devoted to analyzing, as concisely as possible, a couple of the transactions which
Enron allegedly used to manipulate its financial statements, move debt off its balance sheet to
artificially prop up its credit rating, and meet ambitious short-term earnings forecasts.  
It is relatively easy to say, in the abstract, that lawyers should not be “too aggressive” or
should exercise judgment with due regard to the public interest, but I hope to show that these
general standards of professionalism have content when applied to actual transactions that fall
within the zone of professional judgment.  In many of the Enron transactions, an attitude of
professionalism would have required the lawyers to refuse to issue opinion letters in transactions
which arguably, technically, “aggressively” complied with formal legal rules, but where the clear
intent of regulators was not to permit them to occur in that form.18  In other words, a lawyer
would be required to prevent the kind of abuse that is colorfully illustrated by a former Enron
employee: 
19  Quoted in MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1, at 142-43.
20  See Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note 1, at 1309 (due to the complexity of structured-finance
transactions, “the company’s investors must rely, to some extent, on the business judgment of management”).
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Say you have a dog, but you need to create a duck on the financial statements. 
Fortunately, there are specific accounting rules for what constitutes a duck: 
yellow feet, white covering, orange beak.  So you take the dog and paint its feet
yellow and its fur white and you paste an orange plastic beak on its nose, and then
you say to your accountants, “This is a duck!  Don’t you agree that it’s a duck?” 
And the accountants say, “Yes, according to the rules, this is a duck.”  Everybody
knows that it’s a dog, not a duck, but that doesn’t matter, because you’ve met the
rules for calling it a duck.19  
It is not surprising that the rules of financial accounting would have criteria for duck-ness, but a
point often escapes non-lawyers about the nature of rule-based reasoning:  No matter how clear a
rule appears to be, it will always be ambiguous enough to be manipulable, unless the rule is
backstopped by a more substantive legal norm, cast in the form of a standard or principle that is
to be applied using the informed judgment of a decisionmaker.20  Professionalism, in a nutshell,
instructs lawyers not to participate in the hocus-pocus of turning dogs into ducks, and is therefore
a principle for regulating the exercise of interpretive judgment. 
This Article attempts to accomplish two somewhat disparate tasks:  first, to argue for a
theory of interpretation that is a function of a particular account of the nature and authority of
law, and second to apply this theory to an actual lawyering dilemma, considered in enough detail
to make it realistic.  It will engage with jurisprudential questions at a fairly high level of
abstraction, but also show how these theoretical arguments can shed light on the ethical problems
21  Cf. Robert W . Gordon & W illiam H. Simon, The Redemption of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS’
IDE ALS /LAWYERS’ PRACTICES: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE AMERICAN LEGA L PROFESSION  238 (Robert L. Nelson, et
al., eds., 1992) (“The task of applying jurisprudence to the lawyering role is relatively undeveloped and should be on
the agenda of teachers of professional responsibility.”); B URTON, supra  note ___, at xv-xvi (setting out a theory of
adjudication that is practical, in the sense that it does not take a third-party observer’s perspective on judging, but
says something about how a judge should actually decide cases).  
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that lawyers encounter in practice.21  Even fairly esoteric issues in legal theory, like the
Hart/Dworkin debate, can have significant practical implications for lawyers and critics of the
profession, but abstract jurisprudential arguments are seldom brought to bear directly on complex
real world problems.  This fusion may appear quixotic at first, but I hope the Article supports my
hypothesis that by considering jurisprudential issues in the context of actual cases we can make
progress understanding both the theory of legal ethics and the kinds of ethical dilemmas
encountered in practice by sophisticated transactional lawyers. 
A schematic overview of the Article is as follows:   The argument begins in Section II by
considering the attitude of professionalism in contrast with the prevalent view that lawyers may
take a purely instrumental attitude toward law, treating it as merely an obstacle or an
inconvenience to be planned around, rather than a source of normativity that is legitimate.  The
jurisprudential heavy lifting comes in Section III, which considers conceptual arguments about
the nature of law and the relationship between legal and moral norms, as well as the problem of
objectivity in legal interpretation.  Section IV makes these abstract arguments more concrete, by
making the descriptive point that analogues to the professional attitude are very much a feature of
legal reasoning, and by giving a normative argument that the stance of professionalism ought to
be a part of legal reasoning.  Finally, Section V applies this theory of lawyers’ ethics to some of
the transactions that played a role in the collapse of Enron, showing the ways in which we can
22  See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr ., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 459-62 (1897). 
23  See William Twining, The Bad Man Revisited, 58 COR NE LL L. REV. 275 (1973).  
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criticize the lawyers for having engaged in faulty legal reasoning. 
II. Professionalism vs. the Holmesian Bad Man Stance.
The principal target of my argument is the position that lawyers are permitted to take a
“Holmesian bad man” interpretive attitude toward legal norms, regarding them as obstacles to be
planned around, or even costs to be incurred in the course of pursuing one’s client’s projects.22  
Holmes defined the law in terms only of a prediction about how legal officials might decide
particular cases, which he illustrated through the metaphor of a “bad man” who is interested only
in avoiding legal penalties that might attach to his conduct.  The problem with the perspective of
the bad man is not that it is descriptively inaccurate — surely many people, including lawyers, do
care about the law only insofar as it might impose sanctions on them — but that it is
jurisprudentially unsatisfying.  The bad man’s perspective is only one of many standpoints that
one may adopt toward the law,23 and it is far from self-evident that it is the best perspective to
employ when describing the relationship between lawyers and the law.  The choice of an
interpretive standpoint is a normative one, and there must be an argument for why one ought to
adopt the perspective of the bad man, if that perspective is to do any justifying work in
jurisprudence.  As Ronald Dworkin rightly observes, a participant in a social practice does not
regard the practice and its constitutive rules as simply given, but assumes it has some value, in
24  RONALD DWORKIN , LAW’S EMPIRE 47 (1986).  Dworkin uses the term “the interpretive attitude” to
describe the standpoint of participants in a practice who seek to impose some meaning on the practice, and to  see it
in its best light.  Id. at 46-48.  In this Article I will make a more general reference to plural interpretive attitudes,
which need not necessarily be identical with Dworkin’s constructive interpretation theory of law.  The reason for
making this distinction is that I believe Dworkin is right in taking seriously the perspective of participants in a social
practice, or those who take what Hart calls an internal point of view toward the  rules of a practice.  See H.L.A. HART,
THE CON CEPT O F LAW  56, 88-91 (2d ed. 1994).  Dworkin’s use of the singular term “interpretive attitude” is too
strong, however, because people governed by the rules of certain complex social practices may be able to adopt one
of several reasonable stances toward the  rules —  e.g. attitudes of resistance, cautious acquiescence, enthusiastic
embrace, and so on.  The attitude one takes toward the rules is a significant jurisprudential question, and because I
disagree with some aspects of Dworkin’s theory of law, it is important to note this terminological distinction.  
25  Cf. Cass R . Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretation and Institutions, 101 MICH . L. REV. 885 (2003)
(recommending that theories of interpretation take into account the institutional competence of the interpreter);
Joseph Raz, The Problem About the Nature of Law, in ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 195, 203-05 (1994) (arguing
against taking a narrow “lawyer’s perspective,” which eliminates consideration of the lawyer’s relationship with
other institutions such as courts, legislatures, administrative agencies, and various intermediate associations).
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the sense of serving some interest or purpose.24  The focus of a theory of lawyering must
therefore be on the purpose of the legal system and, correspondingly, the point of having
officially licensed and regulated lawyers who represent clients in connection with matters
requiring legal advice, judgment, and skill.25  The argument must be “normative all the way
down,” with a theory of democracy justifying a theory of the function of law, which in turn
justifies a conception of the lawyer’s role.  
Whenever lawyers face serious criticism from regulators or academics for their role in
client malfeasance, they usually defend themselves and their extremely narrow interpretive
attitude by appealing to the lawyer-client relationship and their duties as fiduciaries of clients. 
Their duties, say the lawyers, are limited to protecting client interests by providing competent
representation and keeping secrets, and most certainly do not include serving as gatekeepers or
26  See, e.g., Fisch & Rosen, supra  note ___, at ___; Evan Davis, The Meaning of Professional
Independence, 103 COLUM . L. REV. 1281 (2003); Lawrence J. Fox, The Fallout from Enron:  Media Frenzy and
Misguided Notions of Public Relations are no Reason to Abandon  our Commitment to Our Clients,  2003 U. ILL. L.
REV. 1243-1259 (2003); James A. Cohen, Lawyer Role, Agency Law, and the Characterization of “Officer of the
Court” , 48 BUFF . L. REV. 349 (2000); American Bar Ass’n, Statement of Policy Regarding Responsibilities and
Liabilities of Lawyers in Advising with Respect to the Compliance by Clients with Laws Administered by the
Securities and Exchange Commission, 31 BUS. LAW . 545 (1975); Comments of 79 Law Firms on Proposed SEC
Rule:  Implementation of Standards of Professional Conduct for Attorneys (Apr. 7. 2003), at 2, available at
<www.sec.govrules/proposed/s74502/79lawfirms1.htm> (visited  12/18/03) (“An attorney to an issuer . . . is ethically
bound to act as a legal counselor to, and at times an advocate for, that issuer, is not independent or required to be,
and only in very limited circumstances provides advice that may be relied on by the investing public.”).  Harry
Reasoner, the managing partner of Vinson &  Elkins, one of Enron’s principal outside law firms, defended his firm’s
conduct in similar terms, punting responsibility for ensuring that transactions had economic substance to Enron’s
accountants.  “T here is a  misunderstanding of what outside counsel’s role is,” he said.  “We would have no role in
determining whether, or what, accounting treatment was appropriate.”  John Schwartz , Enron’s Many Strands:  The
Lawyers:  Troubling Questions Ahead for Enron’s Law Firm ,  N.Y. T IMES  (Mar. 12, 2002), at C1.  For a thorough
analysis of the tension between competing conceptions of the lawyers role which came to a head over the National
Student Marketing case, see Simon Lorne, The Corporate and Securities Adviser, The Public Interest, and
Professional Ethics, 76 MICH . L. REV. 423 (1978).
27  Robert W. Gordon, The Ideal and the Actual in the Law, in THE NE W  H IGH PRIESTS:  LAWYERS IN POST-
CIVIL WAR AMERICA 51 (Gerald W. Gawalt ed. 1984).  This hybrid role has long been accepted as a description of
the duties of a prosecutor.  See, e.g., H. Richard  Uviller, The Neutral Prosecutor:  The Obligation of Dispassion in a
Passionate Pursuit, 68 FO R DH A M  L. REV. 1695 (2000).
28  German law recognizes a similar duty on the part of a lawyer to serve as a custodian of the law — ein
Pfleger des Rechts.  
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quasi-regulators of their clients’ transactions.26  This defense misses the point, however, that the
lawyer-client relationship is itself created by the legal system and imposes duties on lawyers to
the extent (and only to the extent) those duties are justified by the social function of the law. 
Lawyers are not judges, who are institutionally charged with the task of remaining impartial, but
they are also not clients, who may be permitted to approach the law from a partisan and self-
interested perspective.  The role of lawyer is something of an amalgam of the judge’s and client’s
roles, serving as a bridge between the biased position of clients and the ideally neutral position of
judges.27  Lawyers are fiduciaries, but not only caretakers of their clients’ interests — they are
also custodians of the law in an important sense.28  Thus, they have a responsibility to build the
interests of third parties into their interpretation of law, even when working on behalf of private
29  See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & D aniel R. Fischel, Antitrust Suits by Targets of Tender Offers, 80
M ICH . L. REV. 1155, 1177 n.57 (1982) (“managers do  not have an ethical duty to obey economic regulatory laws just
because the laws exist.  They must determine the importance of those laws.  The penalties Congress names for
disobedience are a measure of how much it wants firms to sacrifice in order to adhere to the rules; the idea of optimal
sanctions is based on the supposition that managers not only may but also  should  violate the rules when it is
profitable to do so .”).  Cynthia W illiams uses the term “law-as-price” conception to label this interpretive attitude. 
See Cynthia A. W illiams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1267
(1998).  The law-as-price theory is somewhat different, because it expands the Holmesian bad man predictive
orientation toward law into a distinctive theory of entitlement.  According to law-as-price, one has a right to violate
the law which can be obtained simply by “purchasing” the associated penalty, or willingly incurring a risk of the
penalty.  Id. at 1268.  This difference is immaterial for the purposes of this Article, because both the Holmesian bad
man predictive account of law and the law-as-price theory of entitlement are predicated on the same jurisprudential
error, which I will discuss in detail here.  
30  Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Responsibility and Economic Efficiency, 21 PUB. POL’Y  303, 314 (1973).
14
clients.  Although lawyers usually become almost apoplectic at the suggestion that they have any
responsibility toward the legal system or the law as such, the contrary position that lawyers can
approach the law like Holmes’s bad men, is impossible to justify at the level of an institution-
sensitive theory of law and lawyering. 
A. Rational Instrumentalism?
Contemporary defenders of the Holmesian bad man interpretive attitude often identify
with the law and economics movement.29  Of course, an affinity for law and economics does not
make one pro-Enron; indeed, sophisticated neoclassical economic theory may even support
something like the attitude of professionalism.  As Kenneth Arrow points out, contracts, markets,
and transactions depend on relationships of trust and confidence.30  It is impossible to draft
contracts with sufficient specificity to handle every situation that could conceivably arise in the
course of a commercial relationship.  Thus, the parties depend on one another not to behave
opportunistically.  “Every contract depends for its observance on a mass of unspecified
31  Id. at 314.  
32  Stuart M acaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business:  A Preliminary Study, 28 AM . SOC. REV. 55
(1963).
33  See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:  Creating Cooperation
Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH . L. REV. 1724 (2001); Lisa Bernstein, Opting Out of the Legal
System:  Extralegal Contractual Relations in the D iamond Industry, 21 J. LEG. STUD. 115 (1992); David Charny,
Nonlegal Sanctions in Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373 (1990).
34  See, e.g., Coffee, What Caused Enron, supra  note ___, at 279-97; Theodore Eisenberg & Jonathan R.
Macey, Was Arthur Andersen Different?  An Empirical Examination of Major Accounting Firms’ Audits of Large
Clients, 1 J. EM PIRICAL LEG. STUD. 263 (2004); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Attorney As Gatekeeper:  An Agenda for the
SEC, 103 Colum. L. Rev. 1293 (2003); John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding Enron:  “It’s About the Gatekeepers,
Stupid”, 57 BUS. LAW . 1403 (2002); Ronald J . Gilson & Robert H. M nookin, Disputing Through Agents: 
Cooperation and Conflict Between Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM . L. REV. 509 (1994); Reinier Kraakman,
Gatekeepers:  The Anatomy of a Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. &  ORG. 53 (1986); Ronald J.
Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers:  Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); Reinier
Kraakman, Corporate Liability S trategies and the Costs of Legal Contro ls, 93 YALE L.J. 857 (1984). 
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conditions which suggest that performance will be carried out in good faith without insistence on
sticking literally to its wording.”31  In relational contracting, the parties rely on the repeated
nature of their interactions to safeguard against opportunistic behavior.32  A similar dynamic
limits dishonesty in small communities where the participants may encounter one another in a
future commercial relationship and where information about misconduct can be inexpensively
disseminated.33  In one-shot interactions in larger and more impersonal communities, the parties
must use a different mechanism to ensure against exploitation; in this case economic theory uses
the concept of lawyers as reputational intermediaries to explain why a lawyer or law firm would
avoid being too aggressive in structuring transactions.34   The services of gatekeepers, such as
transactional lawyers and auditing firms, signal to the market that the client’s representations are
fair and accurate.  Gatekeepers can perform this function because their principal stock in trade is
a reputation for probity, built up over years of “vouching” for clients by representing them in
transactions.  A gatekeeper firm would squander this reputation by vouching for a client whose
35  See Brian Leiter , Holmes, Economics, and Classical Realism , in THE PATH OF THE LAW AND ITS
INFLUENCE:  THE LEGACY  OF OLIVER WEN DE LL HOLMES, JR. 285 (Steven J. Burton ed. 2000).
36  Cf. Holmes, supra  note ___, at 462 (“The duty to keep a contract at common law means a prediction that
you must pay damages if you do not keep it — and nothing else.”).  The instrumental attitude toward law may be
characterized, in jurisprudential terms, as reducing conduct rules to decision rules.  See Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules:  On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).  Rules are
analytically separable into two categories:  conduct rules which are addressed to individuals and which permit or
forbid  certain actions, and decision rules which are addressed  to officials and regulate the  act of passing judgment. 
Although these categories are conceptually distinct, it is possible to run them together in practice, and conceive of
conduct rules as being entirely a function of decision rules.  See id. at 632.  The Holmesian bad man attitude focuses
interpretation solely on decision rules — i.e. when will a judge determine that I have violated the law?  The attitude
prescribed by professionalism focuses interpretation on conduct rules — i.e. what does the law require?
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representations were dishonest, so its association with a client is a credible signal of the client’s
honesty.  Because gatekeepers have less to gain from dishonesty than clients do, they have a
powerful incentive to monitor the client’s conduct for dishonesty, to avoid losing valuable
credibility.  In effect the gatekeeper becomes a quasi-regulator, ensuring that deals are reached on
the basis of accurate information.  
Nevertheless, the relational-contracting and gatekeeper ideas still concede something
significant to the Holmesian bad man model, namely their bleak vision of professionals as
essentially self-interested, amorally pragmatic actors who take a purely instrumental approach to
the law.35  In the economic vision of professional ethics, the reasons for following the law (or
being honest in contractual relationships) can be reduced to one simple motivation — the fear of
sanctions.36  Sanctions may come in the form of official, state-imposed punishments or nonlegal
penalties such as the loss of business opportunities, but in any event the avoidance of sanctions is
the sole reason any actor would have to refrain from exploiting other parties in a transaction or
treating legal rules as inconveniences to be planned around.  As Holmes so memorably put it, this
attitude toward the law “stinks in the nostrils of those who think it advantageous to get as much
37  Id.
38  G.E. MOORE, PRINCIPIA ETHICA 13 (1903).
39  See W ILLIAM SIMON , THE PRACT ICE OF JUSTICE 27 (1998) (calling this the “Libertarian Premise”);
Robert W . Gordon, Why Lawyers Can’t Just Be Hired Guns, in ETHICS IN PRACTICE:  LAWYERS’ ROLES,
RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION  42, 47 (Deborah L. Rhode ed. 2000) (describing “libertarian-positivist view”)
[hereinafter, “Gordon, Hired Guns”].  For the best known defense of the minimal state, grounded in the value of
autonomy, see ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY , STATE, AND UTO PIA  (1974).  
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ethics into the law as they can.”37  His mocking tone shows his disdain for anyone who regards
the law as legitimate, and therefore a reason for acting.   Economic theory has no place for actors
who are guided by legal norms because they regard them as having moral force.  
But what would be the normative argument for taking a purely instrumental stance toward
the law?  It cannot be the observation that the world is full of Holmesian bad men, which would
be a simplistic version of G.E. Moore’s naturalistic fallacy.38  The most promising candidate for
an argument in favor of instrumentalism relies on libertarian premises — the fundamental moral
significance of human freedom, and the concomitant requirements that any restrictions on liberty
imposed by the state be justified by reasons shared by the object of coercion, general, knowable
in advance of acting, and no broader than necessary to accomplish their purpose.  Indeed, a deep
insight of modern legal ethics theory, characteristic of the work of William Simon and Robert
Gordon, is the extent to which the prevailing attitudes of practicing lawyers toward the law are
reflective of the assumption that the purpose of the legal system is to delineate a sphere of
individual autonomy which is protected against interference by other individuals or the state.39 
But Simon and Gordon have not only recognized this foundation — they, along with David
40  See DAVID LUBAN , LAWYERS AND JUSTICE 167-69 (1988); David Luban, The Lysistratian Prerogative: A
Response to Stephen Pepper, 1986 AM . B. FOUND. RES. J. 637 (1986).
41  MOD EL COD E OF PRO FESS IONA L RESPONSIBILITY , Canon 7 (1981).  
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Luban and others, have completely demolished it.40  In brief, their arguments are that the
autonomy of the client is not some kind of moral trump card over the lawyer’s own moral
agency, which would require reasoning about the permissibility of the client’s ends quite apart
from considerations of the client’s autonomy; that citizens are not entitled to autonomy as such,
but only to a just measure of autonomy that is compatible with the rights of others; that liberty is
only one value among others that a decent legal system would seek to protect; that lawyers
participate to such a great extent in interpreting and applying the law that legal restrictions on
client autonomy can hardly be said to be impartial and general; and that even if autonomy were
the most important thing, its exercise depends on a stable framework of legal norms and
institutions, which is undercut by instrumentalist approaches to the law.
The other principal argument for taking an instrumental stance toward the law trades on
overgeneralization from the paradigm of adversarial litigation.  The most shopworn aphorism in
legal ethics is that a lawyer’s primary duty is to “represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law.”41  Lawyers who seize on this maxim as a justification for interpreting the law as
Holmesian bad men often elide the distinction between acting as an advocate in litigation and
acting as a counselor or transactional engineer.  Ask a securities lawyer why she opposes a
requirement to report out evidence of client fraud, and she is likely to mention the principle of
zealous representation, seemingly without awareness that this phrase, as originally stated in the
42  The Model Code, which was frequently criticized for assimilating all lawyering activities to adversarial
litigation, actually recognizes quite plainly the importance of context.  “Where the bounds of law are uncertain, the
action of a lawyer may depend on whether he is serving as advocate or adviser.”  Id., EC 7-3.  Taking a narrow,
technical, or instrumental attitude toward the law is appropriate only (if at all) in adversarial litigation, and only
where  the lawyer has a good  faith belief that her interpretation of the law is supported by existing norms or by a
reasonable argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law.  Id., EC 7-4.  In adversarial litigation,
this highly partisan stance toward the law may be justified by the effect on the tribunal of opposing partisan
presentations:  “[T]he advocate, by his zealous preparation and presentation of facts and law, enables the tribunal to
come to the hearing with an open and neutral mind and to render impartial judgments.”  Id., EC 7-19.  The attorney
as adviser, however, is bound to render a professional opinion as to the applicability of law, interpreted from the
point of view of an impartial tribunal.  Id., EC 7-5.  The modern law governing lawyers preserves these distinctions. 
Compare  MOD EL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT , Rule 2.1 (2002) [hereinafter, “MOD EL RULES”] (attorney as adviser
must use independent professional judgment and render candid advice) with id., Rule 3.1 (lawyer representing client
in litigated matter may assert any nonfrivolous legal argument).  
43  See LUBAN , supra  note ___, at 56-66.
19
Model Rules, applied only to representation in litigation.  For good reason, however, a lawyer’s
attitude toward the law must vary according to the context in which she is representing a client.42 
A well prepared adversary and a fully informed tribunal are institutional features that are capable
of countering excessive adversarial zeal in litigation and ensuring that legal norms are applied in
an impartial manner.  In litigation, the judge serves as the custodian of the law, and as long as she
is adequately informed and not misled, the parties’ lawyers are justified in leaving to the judge
the responsibility for taking care of the law.  Without an impartial referee, orderly procedures,
rules for obtaining, introducing, and excluding evidence, and a competent opposing party,
however, transactional lawyering is so different from adversarial litigation that one wonders why
anyone has ever thought to analogize the role of lawyer from one context to the other.43 
Whatever psychological enthusiasm a lawyer might feel for her client’s cause, the kind of zealous
representation a lawyer may provide in counseling and transactional practice is circumscribed by
a heightened obligation not to treat the law instrumentally.  In effect, the legal system has
delegated the judge’s caretaker function to the lawyer in cases where the lawyer’s interpretation
44  See Wendel, supra  note ___, at 364.
45  See W ILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERA L PLURALISM  5-6, 28-35 (2002); AMY GUTMANN &  DEN NIS
THOMPSON, DEMOCRACY AND D ISAGREEMENT 21-23 (1996); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER V IRTUE 6-11 (2d ed.
1994); N ICHOLAS RESCHER , PLURALISM :  AGAINST THE DEMAND FOR CONSENSUS 76-78 (1993); Isaiah B erlin, The
Pursuit of the Ideal, in THE CROOKED T IMBER O F HUMAN ITY  1 (1990); STUART HAMPSHIRE, INNOCENCE AND
EXPERIENCE 30-33(1989); Thomas Nagel, The Fragmentation of Value, in MOR TAL QUESTIONS 128 (1979); Thomas
D. M organ & Robert W. Tuttle, Legal Representation in a  Pluralist Society, 63 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 985 (1995); 
WALDRON, supra  note ___, at 175-79.
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of the law is not subject to review by an impartial referee.  
The arguments in this Article are an attempt to provide a secure jurisprudential
foundation for this “caretaker” theory of the authority of law and of legal interpretation — a
model of lawyering which treats legal norms seriously as reasons in a lawyer’s practical
deliberation.  I have called this the authority conception of legal ethics.44  In this view, legal rules
are not only legitimate reasons for action but preclude recourse to ordinary first-order moral
reasons, including the value of client autonomy.  The reason for this preclusion is that the need
for law arises from recognition of deep and persistent disagreement, resulting from a plurality of
worthwhile human goods, values and forms of life; empirical uncertainty; divergent evaluative
standpoints; and what Hume called the circumstances of justice — moderate scarcity and limited
benevolence.45  On many moral or political questions of significance, we can expect
disagreement in good faith that cannot be resolved by reasoning alone; in addition, the
participants in the debate recognize that something must be done, one way or the other, about the
issue.  When these conditions obtain, the parties to the normative disagreement share a desire for
an at least provisional settlement of the issue, enabling coordinated activity notwithstanding the
intractable dispute.  Individuals turn to an impartial, third-party mechanism — the law —
46  See HENRY M. HART, JR. &  ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGA L PROCESS:  BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING
AND APPLICATION OF LAW  1-4 (W illiam N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds. 1994); LARRY ALEXANDER &
EMILY SHER WIN , THE RULE OF RULES:  MORALITY , RULES, AND THE D ILEMM AS OF LAW  11-15 (2001); Larry
Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359 (1997). 
47  This conception of the authority of law is derived from Joseph Raz’s normal justification thesis.  See
JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORA LITY O F FREEDOM  53 (1986); Joseph Raz, Introduction, in AUTHORITY 1, 12-13 (Joseph Raz
ed. 1990).  It is substantially influenced by Jeremy Waldron’s use of the Razian normal justification thesis (NJT). 
See WALDRON, supra  note ___, at 95-96.  Both are  discussed in considerably more  detail in W endel, supra  note ___. 
I am making stronger claims for the force of the N JT than Raz would accept, but I believe they are consistent with
Waldron’s expansive use of Raz’s conception of authority.  
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because they share the desire for peaceful cooperation and settlement.46  Because the law permits
them to do better at realizing this interest than they would on their own, and because it is adopted
through procedures that meet a threshold standard of fairness and respect for the parties to the
normative disputes, the law has authority in the domain of the disagreement and precludes
practical reasoning on the basis of the reasons that were relevant to the underlying controversy.47 
This is essentially the argument for the negative aspect of professionalism, which preempts
recourse to reasons that would otherwise require a different action in the circumstances, where a
legal norm is in force.  The positive aspect of professionalism flows from the same conception of
the authority of law, and requires lawyers to interpret legal norms in such a way that the law can
continue to perform its coordination and settlement functions.  
Before working through the defense of this position in detail, it may be helpful to take a
preliminary look at some examples of how one’s interpretive attitude would make a difference to
judicial decisions or the advice given to clients.  (The final section of the Article will review a
longer example involving the Enron transactions.)  As the examples should make clear, the
approach to legal interpretation that flows from the authority conception of legal ethics is
48  For some of the most important contributions to this debate, see John Manning, Constitutional Structure
and Statutory Formalism,  66 U. CHI. L. REV. 685 (1999); Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of
Judicial Competence:  The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833 (1998); Richard J. Pierce,
Jr., The Supreme Court’s New Hypertextualism:  An Invitation to Cacophony and Incoherence in the Administrative
State , 95 COLUM . L. REV. 749 (1995); Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory
Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &  PUB. POL’Y  61 (1994); Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: 
Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533 (1992) [hereinafter, “Farber, Inevitability”];
Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 (1992); William
N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism , 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey,
Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Frederick Schauer, Statutory
Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SUP. CT. REV. 231 [hereinafter, “Schauer,
Statutory Construction”]; Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405
(1989); Daniel A. Farber, Statutory Interpretation and Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO . L.J. 281 (1989); Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains,  50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983).
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different from both textualism and some of its more loosely structured competitors.48  Legal texts
alone cannot achieve the settlement that is the function of law, because they are never self-
interpreting.  Texts must be interpreted in light of their evident purpose, the background against
which they were enacted, and the interpretive understandings of the relevant community of
lawyers and judges.  The most important features of this style of interpretation is the preclusion
of the policy preferences or first-order moral beliefs of interpreters, and the resistance to the
manipulation of the form of legal norms to defeat their substance.  Professionalism, as defended
here, does not instruct lawyers to act in the public interest, which may be internally incoherent
and normatively contested, but by what the public has come up with as its laws, through the
process of legislation, administrative rulemaking, and adjudication.  Professionalism is grounded
in fidelity to a society’s laws, but it is critical that law not be understood narrowly or
formalistically.  Rather, the law must be interpreted in a way that ensures it will continue to have
the capacity to coordinate social action against a background of persistent first-order normative
disagreement.  
49  This problem is based on Johnson v. Southern Pacific , 196 U.S. 1 (1904), reversing 117 F. 462  (8th Cir.
1902), two casebook classics illustra ting issues in statutory interpretation, but I freely embellished many of the facts. 
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B. Some Examples.  
The conception of professionalism I have been defending makes reference to “substantive
meanings” of legal norms, as opposed to their mere formal expression.  One natural objection to
this position is that legal norms do not have a substantive meaning apart from their textual form. 
The following two examples of ethical dilemmas in lawyering are designed to show that even the
simplest legal norms, either statutes or cases, depend for their meaning on interpretive
understandings that are not captured in texts themselves.  If a reader is persuaded that these non-
textual conventions and practices of legal reasoning are actually relevant to determining the
relevant law, then the only remaining step in the argument for professionalism is to establish the
wrongfulness of ignoring them.
The Miserly Railroad.  The Northern Atlantic Railroad has asked its general counsel
whether it is required to make an expensive modification to its locomotives.  It is concerned that
a new federal statute may mandate retrofitting the locomotives with an automatic coupling
device.49  The relevant statutory language reads:
On and after the first day of January, nineteen hundred and ninety-eight, it shall be
unlawful for any such common carrier to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its
line any car used in moving interstate traffic not equipped with couplers coupling
automatically by impact, and which can be uncoupled without the necessity of
men going between the ends of the cars.  
50  McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931) (interpreting a statute criminalizing “transporting in
interstate commerce a motor vehicle, knowing the same to have been stolen”).
51  The facts of this problem are taken from Carnival Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991).  The issue
of lawyers’ ethical responsibility for drafting adhesion contracts has been widely discussed.  See, e.g., Henry
Ordower, Toward a Multiple Party Representation M odel:  Moderating Power Disparity, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1263
(2003); William T. Vukowich, Lawyers and the Standard Form Contract System:  A Model Rule That Should Have
Been, 6 GEO . J. LEGA L ETHICS 799  (1993).  See also Robert A. Hillman & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard Form
Contracting in the Electronic Age,  77 NYU L. REV. 429 (2002) (not focusing on lawyers, but providing an
interesting overview of technological innovations in standard-form contracts, such as shrink-wrap and “click-wrap”
licenses). 
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The railroad’s vice-president for engineering told the general counsel that for technical reasons, it
is much more difficult to equip locomotives, as opposed to ordinary cars, with automatic
coupling devices.  She pointed out that the statute requires automatic couplers on “cars,” which
in the ordinary parlance of railroad workers would not be understood to include locomotives. 
(She actually overheard a snippet of dialogue in which one employee at a switching yard asked,
“are there any cars on that track?” and was told, “nope, just a locomotive.”)  Moreover, the
examples used to illustrate the definition of “car” in the Oxford English Dictionary all referred to
conveyances that are pulled by a locomotive:  passenger car, sleeping car, coal car, freight car,
and so on.  Her argument was supported by the use in the statute of the verb “haul,” of which
“car” is an object — locomotives are not hauled; they do the hauling.  The general counsel also
remembered reading in law school a case involving the theft of an airplane, in which the
Supreme Court noted that the operative term “vehicle” did not “evoke in the common mind” the
image of an airplane.50  What advice should the general counsel give to the railroad regarding
compliance with the statute?  
Fine Print on the Ticket.51  Festival Cruise Lines hired an outside law firm to review its
standard ticket contract, and recommend changes if necessary.  One provision caught the eye of a
52  This language is currently in use by Carnival Cruise Lines in its standard form ticket contract.  
<http://www.carnival.com/CMS/Static_Templates/ticket_contract.aspx> (visited 6/19/04).
53  See Daniel E. W enner, Renting in Collegetown, 84 COR NE LL L. REV. 543 (1999).
54  The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore, 407 U.S. 1 (1972).  
55  Williams v. W alker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965).  
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junior associate in the firm who had been assigned to review the contract:
It is agreed by and between the Guest and Festival that all disputes and matters
whatsoever arising under, in connection with or incident to this Contract or the
Guest's cruise, including travel to and from the vessel, shall be litigated, if at all,
before the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida in
Miami, or as to those lawsuits to which the Federal Courts of the United States
lack subject matter jurisdiction, before a court located in Miami-Dade County,
Florida, U.S.A. to the exclusion of the Courts of any other county, state or
country.52 
Having had many depressing experiences with standard-form leases as a graduate student,53 the
associate questioned the propriety of including the forum-selection clause in the cruise contract. 
He was troubled by uncertainty in the law.  On the one hand, the Supreme Court had upheld
forum-selection clauses when negotiated between two sophisticated business parties, specifically
in the maritime context.54  On the other hand, appellate courts had refused to enforce certain
terms in standard-form contracts where one party had an absence of meaningful choice as to
whether to accept a contract term that is unreasonably favorable to the other party.55  He also
knew that many passengers would be coming from homes far away from Miami, and would face
considerable inconvenience and expense if they were required to litigate in South Florida. 
Although the language of the contract was clear, it was buried in the fine print on the back of the
ticket, which passengers never read.  The associate therefore worried that including the contract
56  MOD EL RULES, supra  note ___, Rule 8.4(c).
57  Id., Rule 5.2(b).
58  Cf. Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985) (arguing that doctrinal, factual, and
linguistic factors may make a particular outcome easy for competent lawyers to predict).
59  “Situation sense” is a term favored by Karl Llewellyn.  See KAR L LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION:  DECIDING APPE ALS  60-61, 268-85  (1960).  Anthony Kronman uses the Aristotelian terms prudence (as a
translation of phronesis) and practical wisdom to  convey a similar notion.  See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN , THE LOST
LAWYER  (1993); Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel’s Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1985).  Modern
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term might constitute”conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation,”56 but his
supervisor told him that the client insisted on retaining the forum-selection clause, unless it was
plainly illegal.  The associate concluded that there was no plain illegality, reasoned that his
supervisor’s instructions were a “reasonable resolution of an arguable question of professional
duty,”57 and said nothing more.  Should he have acquiesced in the inclusion of the contract term?  
In both of these cases, the content of the law on point is facially uncertain, if law is
understood as a property of legal texts alone.  In the railroad case, the apparent uncertainty is the
result of linguistic ambiguity (does the term “car” encompass locomotives?); in the forum-
selection clause case, it is the result of conflicting precedents or competing analogies (“is the
cruise case more like a different kind of maritime activity or a different kind of consumer sales
contract?”).  I suspect, however, that readers have already concluded that these cases do not
actually involve any serious uncertainty.58  The railroad must equip the locomotives with
automatic couplers, and the cruise line is free to include the forum-selection clause in the
contract.  What justifies these conclusions?  The answer to any question of legal interpretation is
ultimately provided by the conventions and practices of legal reasoning, which form the basis for
the exercise of informed, sound “situation sense,” prudence, practical reasoning, or judgment.59  
commentators on statutory interpretation favor the term “practical reason.”  See, e.g., Farber, Inevitability, supra
note ___; Eskridge & Frickey, supra  note ___; see also  BURTON, supra  note ___, at 6 n.9 (citing sources).  One
might even use the term “pragmatism,” as popularized by Richard Posner, among others.  See, e.g., Richard Posner,
Pragmatic Adjudication, in THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM 235 (Morris Dickstein ed. 1998).  I will use the term
judgment throughout the Article, but it should be understood that I am appealing to this vigorous tradition of legal
theory, whatever label a particular writer chooses.  And I intend as well to appeal (without elaboration, because of
the constraints of space and relevance) to the work of critics within moral philosophy who seek to establish objective
truths of ethics while making room for contextual judgment.  See, e.g., HILARY PUTNAM , ETHICS W ITHOUT
ONTOLOGY (2004).
60  Pierce, supra  note ___, at 750-52.
61  See, e.g., MELVIN ARON EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW  (1988); Owen M. Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982).
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Legal reasoning begins with the text of statutes and the holdings of cases, to be sure, but
does not end there.  Indeed, a judge or lawyer might commit the vice of “hypertextualism” by
pretending that the language of a statute, dictionary definitions, and rules of syntax are
sufficiently determinate to produce an objective interpretation of a text.60  Although the statute in
the railroad case uses the word “car,” the legislature may have intended to require coupling
devices on locomotives as well (perhaps after hearing testimony about the frequency of
locomotive-car coupling accidents), and only a myopic fixation on the literal language of the
statute would cause an interpreter to miss this apparent meaning of the text.  Moreover, statutory
language, definitions of words, canons of construction, and so on, might create as much
interpretive freedom as more expansive methods like purposivism or intentionalism, thereby
permitting the interpreter to impose her own policy preferences on the text, under the guise of
rendering an objective reading.  Similarly, in common-law reasoning, the facts and arguments set
out in a given judicial opinion are highly manipulable when considered in isolation.   Fortunately,
in both of these styles of legal reasoning, there are second-level principles that have developed in
any given domain of law that stabilize and regulate interpretation.61  
62  2A NORMAN J. SINGER , SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION  § 47 .23, at 216-17 (5 th ed. 1992). 
This was one of the  arguments made by the court of appeals in this case.  See 117 F. at ___.
63  Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons About How
Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06 (1950).  A notorious example of a court disregarding the
expressio unius canon is Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), in which a statute making it a
crime to assist “the importation or migration of any alien” contained exceptions for certain categories of workers,
such as lecturers, actors, and domestic servants, but said nothing about “brain toilers” and “ministers of the gospel.” 
The Court nevertheless held the statute inapplicable to an elite New York City church which had arranged for the
entry of its new rector from England.  
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1. Statutory Analysis.
Consider first an example of statutory interpretation — the railroad case.  The word “car”
in isolation does not answer the question whether the railroad is required to equip its locomotives
with automatic couplers; if anything, it suggests a counterintuitive negative response.  Starting
with the text of the statute does tell us something; under this particular statute the railroad is not
required to equip cars with air brakes, doors that can be opened from the inside, or some other
useful safety feature.  But the text still leaves interpretive puzzles.  What about the absence of the
term “locomotive”?  Congress could easily have drafted the provision to read “any car or
locomotive . . . not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by impact.”  Under the canon
of construction known as expressio unius est exclusio alterius,62 an interpreter should infer from
the inclusion of the term “car” and the absence of the term “locomotive” that Congress intended
the statute not to apply to locomotives.  Of course, as Karl Llewellyn demonstrated in one of the
best known critiques of formalism, every canon of statutory construction has an opposing canon,
which should be used “when the context dictates.”63  In this case, if the context so dictates, one
could argue that locomotives should be included from the opposing canon that the statute may
comprehend cases beyond those specifically mentioned in the text, particularly if it is apparent
64  In reversing the Eighth Circuit, the Supreme Court relied heavily on Congressional intention and the
purpose of the statute.  See 196 U.S. at ___.
65  3 SINGER , supra  note ___ § 59.03, at 102-05.  The court of appeals also relied on the rule of lenity.  117
F. at ___.
66  Interpretation by ascription-of-intention is a disfavored  methodology in modern jurisprudence, owing to
powerful critiques by Dworkin and o thers.  See DWORKIN , supra  note ___, at 313-27; W ALDRON, supra  note ___, at
124-29; ANTONIN SCALIA, A  MATTER O F INTERPRETATION  29-32 (1997); Eskridge &  Frickey, supra  note ___, at
325-32; Easterbrook, supra  note ___; Stephen F. W illiams, Restoring  Context, Distorting Text:  Legislative History
and the Problem of Age, 66 GEO . WASH . L. REV. 1366 (1998).  Briefly, the problems with imputing intentions to a
multi-member representative body are that there is no speaker or actor to whom to ascribe an actual unitary intention,
and that constructing a fictional unitary intention by combining the intentions of individual legislators is doomed to
failure because of theoretical difficulties involved in identifying and cumulating the mental states of dozens, if not
hundreds of legislators.  Each legislator may had a variety of mental states with respect to the proposed legislation —
enthusiastic support, cautious assent, isolated qualms, serious reservations, or utter indifference.  Legislators also
may be moved by motives of rent-seeking, party loyalty, or logrolling , without regard to the content of the provision
under consideration.  See DAN IEL A. FARBER &  PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE (1991).  Specifically
with respect to intention regarding interpretation, a legislator may hope that an interpreter would read the text in a
particular way, even though she fully expected a different interpretation to gain acceptance.  Even if we could
identify the intentions of individuals, the actual text voted on by the majority may represent the intention of none of
the individuals, because of the way preferences are registered in an assembly.  Attempting to divine collective
intention from legislative history is no less problematic, because of the manipulability of legislative history and the
multiplicity of interpretations that can be supported by the relevant history documents such as committee reports and
remarks made on the floor by supporters and opponents of the bill.  Interpreting statutes by selecting bits and pieces
of legislative history has often been criticized as tantamount to “looking over a crowd and picking out your friends.” 
See Patricia Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981 Supreme Court Term , 68 IO W A
L. REV. 195, 214 (1983); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U .S. 511, 519 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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that the statute has a purpose (such as protecting the safety of railroad workers) that would be
advanced by requiring couplers on locomotives.64  And these are only principles of interpretation
based on the language of a statute.  There are also policy-based aids to construction, such as the
rule of lenity, which provides that an ambiguous criminal statute should be read narrowly.65  The
case mentioned by the railroad’s vice-president, involving the theft of an airplane, can arguably
be justified on this basis.  Furthermore, we can ascribe a variety of hypothetical intentions to
Congress (in the absence of clear legislative history).66  Perhaps Congress wanted to improve
safety for railroad workers, even though it would impose high costs on the railroads, in which
case couplers should be required on locomotives.  On the other hand, the statute may have
67  The scheme which limited couplers to non-locomotive cars might be an example of what Dworkin would
call a “checkerboard” statute, which seems to resolve the dispute in an arbitrary or unprincipled way.  See DWORKIN ,
supra  note ___, at 178-84.  Dworkin believes he is tapping into a generally shared intuition that checkerboard
statutes are objectionable because we would prefer ex an te that our preferred legal norm be either adopted or
rejected, but not compromised.  “Even if I thought strict liability for accidents wrong in principle, I would prefer that
manufacturers of both washing machines and automobiles be held to that standard than that only one of them be.” 
Id. at 182.  But leaving aside obvious checkerboards like a statute that made abortion legal on Mondays but illegal
on Tuesdays, it is not clear that all legislative compromises like Dworkin’s product liability statute are unprincipled. 
There may be good reasons for imposing strict liability on automobile manufacturers but not washing machine
manufacturers.  (Perhaps washing machines are easier for users to inspect, or the expected cost of accidents is not as
high, as compared with automobiles.)  In the ra ilroad case, if for some reason it is significantly more expensive to
install couplers on locomotives, or if the operation of automatic couplers on locomotives creates some new danger
that would not be present if they were used only on non-locomotive cars, the exclusion of locomotives from the
coupler requirement would  not be  a checkerboard  statute in Dworkin’s sense.  
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represented a compromise between workplace-safety advocates and the railroad industry, in
which case it fairly should be read as requiring couplers only on non-locomotive cars.67  
As in most legal cases, it is possible to line up arguments in favor of both positions in the
railroad case.  This is the point at which analysis of statutory interpretation often resorts to
metaphors of weighing and balancing to capture the process of exercising judgment.  The trouble
with these tropes is that the process of comparison they suggest creates an illusion of precision
which in turn encourages unrealistic expectations about the objectivity of judging.  To put it
another way, judgment sometimes functions as a black box in legal theory — one result or
another mysteriously pops out of the decision-making machinery, but the process itself is opaque
to observation and criticism from a third-person point of view.  Sophisticated legal theorists do
not use judgment in this way, however.  In every serious account of legal interpretation, the
interpreter’s judgment is constrained by something external to the interpreter, which is available
for public observation and criticism.  This external constraint of public justifiability secures the
objectivity of judgment against the critique that the interpreter is simply imposing her own policy
68  DWORKIN , supra  note ___, at 337-38, 345-46.
69  See Eskridge, Dynam ic, supra  note ___, at 1496-97 (proposing continuum in which text controls where it
provides determinate answers, but history, social and legal context, and evolutive context assume more importance
as textualist interpretations become more contestible); Eskridge & Frickey, supra  note ___, at 352-53 (proposing
“funnel of abstraction” in which interpreter begins with statutory text and tests potential interpretations for historical
accuracy and conformity to contemporary circumstances and values).
70  Cf. Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note 1, at 1313 (suggesting that some of the decisions of
accountants and lawyers in the Enron transactions may look bad ex post , but at the time were defensible exercises of
discretionary judgment).  
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preferences on the law.  
For example, Ronald Dworkin is the most enthusiastic proponent of a thoroughgoing
interpretive approach to law, and he is quite clear that his hypothetical interpreter, the
superhuman judge Hercules, must exercise judgment with respect to an external standard — the
best justification of a legal speech-act (a judicial decision or the enactment of a statute) where
“best” is understood in terms of the coherence of the principles underlying the act (i.e. as reasons
explaining and justifying the act) with a political community’s ideals of integrity, fairness, and
political due process.68  Dworkin refers to this external constraint as integrity, and offers integrity
as a criterion for others to judge whether Hercules has exercised his judgment correctly.  Other
theorists construct a framework of criteria, rebuttable presumptions, or a continuum of
complementary interpretive methodologies.69  However these external checks on interpretive
discretion are constructed, they are essential to ensure against not only rampant subjectivity by
the interpreter, but also against reaching ex post evaluations of the propriety of an interpretation
that would not have been as clear ex ante.70  
To these models of judgment I would add a critical jurisprudential element: 
71  Gerald Postema, “Protestant” Interpretation and Social Practices, 6 LA W  &  PHIL. 283 (1987). 
72  See W ILLIAM TWINING, KAR L LLEWELLYN AND  THE REALIST MOVEMENT 205 (1973) (discussing
Llewellyn’s arguments in The Common Law Tradition); BURTON, supra  note ___, at 19-22 (arguing that the rule of
law demands that judges be able to justify their decisions on the basis of reasons about what the  law is, as opposed to
what they think it should be).  
73  Anthony T. Kronman, Living in the Law,  54 U. CHI. L. REV. 835, 848 (1987).
74  HART &  SACKS, supra  note __, at 143.
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Interpretation is not a function of a single judicial or lawyerly mind, acting alone.71  Rather, it is a
community-bound enterprise, in which the criteria for reasonable exercise of judgment are
elaborated intersubjectively, among an interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to
law.  These criteria are available to provide a justification of a decision.72  As Anthony Kronman
correctly points out, a person characterized by good judgment “is not someone who from time to
time merely makes certain strikingly appropriate oracular pronouncements.”73  Rather, a person
of good judgment can, if called upon to do so, provide a reasoned explanation of her decision.74 
This explanation is a public phenomenon, in the sense that the interpreter is appealing to shared
community standards for evaluating the appropriateness of interpretation.  In this way, the
interpreter’s discretion is constrained by public norms regulating the understanding of legal texts. 
The meaning of these texts therefore becomes a property of the community, which confers the
ultimate authority on legal norms, and the community’s standards are legitimate to the extent
they respect the purpose of law, which is to enable people to live peacefully together, flourish,
and achieve their common ends.  
A textualist might respond that I have assumed too hastily that judgment is necessary. 
Perhaps the plain language if the statute provides sufficient determinacy to accomplish the
75  WALDRON, supra  note ___, at 25, 77-82.
76  Id. at 79.  
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settlement of normative disputes that is the function of law.  One might also make the argument
from the authority of law by noting that legal norms are legitimate only to the extent they are
enacted by fair procedures, and in the case of legislation, those procedures involve a majority
vote on a particular form of words embodied in the resolution under discussion.75  But the
argument from authority shows only that “the product of legislation” is entitled to respect, not
that the product of legislation is simply a text, the interpretation of which is confined to the literal
language of the enactment.  Even Jeremy Waldron, who makes the argument from authority
powerfully, concedes that “statutes need interpretation [and] the words of the enactment (and
their ‘plain meaning’) are often insufficient to determine the statute’s application.”76  For
Waldron, the important thing is that the interpretive process begin with the sense that there is a
single, definitive proposal under discussion, and that the meaning of the proposal should be
recovered by beginning with the text of the enactment.  Suppose in the railroad case that the
legislature had responded to a series of lurid reports of accidents, and resulting public outcry.  In
the course of considering some response, it became apparent that workers were injured by
attaching locomotives to cars as well as by hooking non-locomotive cars together.  The course of
discussion in the legislature reveals that all members of the assembly were concerned with this
problem in toto, although the members disagreed on other points, such as whether to make new
safety measures mandatory or voluntary.  In that instance, is there any doubt that the word “car”
should be interpreted to include locomotives?  This interpretation is not undermined by the
reasons for treating the enactment as authoritative, because the legislative response was aimed at
77  See Lawrence M. Solan, Priva te Language, Public Laws:  The Central Role of Leg islative In tent in
Statutory Interpretation, __ GEO . L.J. __ (2004) (“At the very least [legislative history] can help us to determine
whether the difficulty in applying the statute results from an unfortunate choice of statutory language to effectuate a
legislative goal that is very clear once one investigates the matter.”); W illiam N. Eskridge, Jr., The Circumstances of
Politics and the Application of Statutes, 100 COLUM . L. REV. 558, 566 (2000) (book review).  
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settling some disagreement other than a disagreement over whether the word “car” should
include locomotives.  Thus, one should not assume that the functional argument for the authority
of law necessarily entails a textualist interpretive methodology; in fact, it may support a broader
purposivist approach to statutory meaning.77  
2. Common-Law Reasoning.
Judgment is also necessary in common-law reasoning because it is impossible fully to
specify meta-rules that capture the complexity of legal interpretation, when the decisionmaker
must consider texts, principles, and facts, as well as subsidiary norms such as rules of legal
salience (which point to aspects of the facts that are germane to the decision), considerations of
weight and priority among competing norms, and the possibility of justified departures from
previously sanctioned interpretations.  Consider a famous example of the interplay between facts
and rules in case interpretation, from Karl Llewellyn’s Bramble Bush:  
What are the facts?  The plaintiff’s name is Atkinson and the defendant’s
Walpole.  The defendant, despite his name, is an Italian by extraction, but the
plaintiff’s ancestors came over with the Pilgrims.  The defendant has a schnauzer-
dog named Walter, red hair, and $30,000 worth of life insurance. . . .  The
defendant’s auto was a Buick painted pale magenta.  He is married.  His wife was
in the back seat, an irritable, somewhat faded blonde.  She was attempting back-
seat driving when the accident occurred.  He had turned around to make objection. 
In the process the car swerved and hit the plaintiff.  The sun was shining; there
was a rather lovely dappled sky low to the West.  The time was late October on a
78  KAR L LLEWELLYN , THE BRAMBLE BUSH  46-47 (1951) (emphasis in original).
79  See, e.g., Taylor v. Metzger, 706 A.2d 685 (N.J. 1998) (recognizing cause of action for intentional
infliction of emotional distress arising out of racial epithets uttered in an employment setting).  
80  Cf.  BARBARA HERMAN , THE PRACT ICE OF MOR AL JUDGMENT 75 (1993) (“An agent who came to the
[Kantian Categorical Imperative] procedure with no knowledge of the moral characteristics of actions would be very
unlikely to describe his action in a  morally appropriate way.”).  See also  Michael Moore, Torture and the Balance of
Evils , 23 ISRA EL L. REV. 280, 287-88 (1989) (arguing that moral knowledge of the domain of consequentialist
calculation is needed before it is possible to proceed to consider consequences in moral reasoning).  Note that Moore
does not subscribe to an intuitionist view, in which knowledge of the domain of consequentialist calculation is
something mysterious and ineffable; rather, he reviews numerous rigorous standards (such as the act/omission and 
intended/foreseeable distinctions, the preexisting peril doctrine, and Judith Jarvis Thomson’s principle of redirecting
harms) which justify the boundary between permissible and impermissible use of consequences in moral reasoning. 
Id. at 299-308.  Moore boils these down to the standard  threefold analysis of criminal law culpability, id. at 308-09,
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Tuesday.  The road was smooth, concrete.  It had been put in by the McCarthy
Road Work Company.78
It does not take more than a couple of weeks of law school for a first-year student to learn to
winnow out the relevant facts from an example like this.  But what has the student learned? 
Surely not a system of rules that can be applied deductively (e.g. “if the dispute involves an auto
accident, road conditions may be relevant but not the plaintiff’s ethnic ancestry”), because any set
of rules would quickly become too complex to learn and apply.  For example, the identity of the
construction company may or may not be legally salient, depending on whether the case involves
allegations that the design of the road contributed to poor visibility.  Life insurance may matter if
this is a case in which the collateral source rule is an issue.  Even the ethnic background of the
plaintiff and defendant might conceivably matter if the auto accident had been only the precursor
to a violent argument in which insults were exchanged, and out of which the plaintiff claims
infliction of emotional distress.79  Some knowledge of the law is necessary to know which facts
are relevant, but the relevance-making relationship between law and facts is not constituted by
rules.80  Instead of rule-application, this reasoning process involves the exercise of informed
but the application of these criteria still calls for the exercise of judgment, as opposed to deductive reasoning.  The
point is not that the student’s judgment in my example, or the ascription of responsibility in Moore’s, is incapable of
being justified or theorized, but that the precise nature of reasoning process is often opaque to the person exercising
judgment.  See generally  DONALD SCHÖN, THE REFLECTIVE PRACTITIONER :  HO W  PROFESSIONALS THINK IN ACTION
(1983).
81  HART &  SACKS, supra  note ___, at 146-48.  
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professional judgment, which can be justified on the basis of rules and standards, but which is
always incompletely specified, or underdetermined by rules and standards.  These higher-order
norms are acquired and internalized through professional education and followed largely
unconsciously within a given interpretive community.  
My claim is that these higher-order norms are legitimate, and have authority to the
exclusion of ordinary moral reasons, to the extent they enable to law to fulfill its function of
optimizing people’s ability to work together to achieve common projects.81  The law would fail at
this end if one of two conditions obtained:  (1) it were impossible for a representative of a client
to discern the content of the law, or (2) it were permissible for individual legal interpreters, such
as lawyers, to manipulate the formal expression of legal norms to make them mean anything at
all, thereby defeating their substantive purpose.  Thus, if it is apparent that the purpose of the
statute in the railroad case is to prevent accidents caused by workers getting their hands caught in
manual coupling mechanisms, there will be good grounds for interpreting the statute to require
automatic couplers on locomotives.  Naturally, a contrary purpose may be apparent — perhaps,
as suggested previously, the statute was a compromise between advocates of a comprehensive
reform of railroad safety regulations and those who preferred a more cautious, incremental
approach.  In that case, one might make a reasonable argument for not requiring the automatic
82  See BURTON, supra  note ___, at xii, 5-12, 47-48, 79-80.  The term “hard cases”  is associated with
Dworkin’s debate with Hart.  See Ronald D workin, Hard Cases, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIO US LY  81 (1977)
[hereinafter, “Dworkin, Hard Cases”].
83  HART &  SACKS, supra  note ___, at 148.  
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couplers on locomotives.  But the crucial term here is reasonable.  The demand is, in any event,
for a reasoned elaboration of an interpretation of legal texts.  Appealing only to formal features
like the statutory text is not a reasoned elaboration, absent some argument why the form alone
ought to have dispositive importance in the particular case.  Similarly, in the forum-selection
clause case, the lawyer must be able to offer a reasoned argument for analogizing the clause in
the cruise ticket to either the forum-selection clause in the cargo carriage contract (permissible)
or the unconscionable contract terms in the installment-sales contract (impermissible). 
Professionalism does not necessarily favor one interpretation or another, but it does rule out the
kind of facile analogy-drawing that might be used by a lawyer who was interested only in taking
advantage of a superficial similarity between two cases.  
3. Hard Cases and Right Answers.
Finally, to anticipate a common objection to this line of reasoning, it is important to
emphasize that I am not denying the existence of “hard cases,” where the relevant legal texts and
interpretive practices underdetermine the result.82  Hart and Sacks confidently assert that
“[u]nderlying every rule and standard . . . is at least a policy and in most cases a principle [which
is] available to guide judgment in resolving uncertainties about the arrangement’s meaning.”83 
Although I share their belief that underlying purposes, policies, and principles are available to
84  Kent Greenawalt, Discretion and the Judicial Decision:  The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind
Judges, 75 COLUM . L. REV. 359, 368-69 (1975).  
85  I do not believe it is possible to define “plausible” legal arguments in mathematical terms — e.g. whether
a 10% chance, a 30% chance, and so on, is necessary before we can deem an interpretation of law plausible. 
Plausible is certainly more than passing the proverbial straight-face test.  The standard should be understood instead
in terms of an attitude or conviction on the part of the lawyer who offers the interpretation, and may be fleshed out
with reference to a kind of hypothetical reasonable observer.  One possible heuristic is that if a lawyer would be
comfortable making the argument to the judge for whom she clerked, a professor she respects, or  a colleague who is
known for her good sense and judgment, the argument is plausible.  If the lawyer could stand behind an
interpretation, take pride in it, and offer it to a third party the lawyer respects for her sound judgment, then the
interpretation is plausible.  
I recognize that it can be difficult to give a rigorous logical account of the distinction between a plainly
implausible legal argument (say, one with only a 1% chance of success) and a clearly plausible one (say, one with a
98%  chance of success).  See Sorites Paradox, in THE CAMBRIDGE D ICTION ARY  OF PHILOSOPHY  864 (Robert Audi
ed., 2d ed. 1999); Jeremy W aldron, Vagueness in Law and Language:  Some Philosophical Issues, 82 CAL. L. REV.
523 (1994).  But law does not lend itself to bivalent logic and always demands the exercise of judgment.  Further
support for this assertion must await the arguments in Section ___.   As a preliminary matter, even if we are  uncertain
whether we need three, four, five, or n stones to make a heap, it does not mean that there are no such things as heaps. 
Moore, supra  note ___, at 332.  By analogy, even if we may be unsure on the margins whether an argument is
frivolous, we should not conclude that there is no such thing as a frivolous argument.  
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guide judgment, the passage quoted is made too strong by the singular nouns — a policy, a
principle.  Many legal rules and standards serve multiple, sometimes conflicting purposes.  In
addition, purpose is not the only key to a statute’s meaning — the express language of the statute
may be in conflict with its purpose, and there may be other indications, such as legislative history
and context, that cut against the interpretation suggested by the apparent purpose (even if there is
only one).  For these reasons, there are a great many cases in which competent judges or lawyers,
reasoning in good faith, could reach result A or result B, and be deemed by a competent observer
to have performed her job adequately.84  An observer might disagree with B, and believe that A
was the better result, but nevertheless concede that B was within the range of plausible,
justifiable results.85  For example, consider a municipal ordinance that bans vehicles in excess of
6,000 pounds from residential streets — does the ordinance apply to monster sport-utility
86  See Andy Bowers, California’s SUV Ban, SLATE (Aug. 4, 2004), <http://slate.msn.com/id/2104755>
(visited 8/4/04).
87  See Heydon’s Case, [1584] 76 E.R. at 638.
88  See Union of Concerned  Scientists, Tax Incentives:  SUV Loophole Widens, Clean Vehicle Credits Face
Uncertain Future , <http://www.ucsusa.org/clean_vehicles/cars_and_suvs/page.cfm?pageID=1280> (visited 8/4/04).
89  In fairness to Hart and Sacks, they recognize the problem of indeterminacy:  “It may even be said that
more than one answer is permissible, in the sense that if one answer had been conscientiously reached and generally
accepted a reviewing court might well think it ought not to be upset , even though its own answer would have been
different as an original matter.”  HART &  SACKS, supra  note ___, at 149.  Fairly or not, however, The Legal Process
has become known as the locus classicus of the attribution-of-purpose method of statutory interpretation, and Hart
and Sacks are usually understood to have relied on an assumption that a statute, case, or legal doctrine has a single
purpose standing behind it.  See, e.g., Eskridge & Frickey, supra  note ___, at 333-37.  I do want to make clear that I
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vehicles like the Ford Excursion and Cadillac Escalade?86  The ordinance is intended to reduce
wear and tear on municipal streets, as well as prevent accidents caused by heavy trucks driving in
residential neighborhoods.  Not only do large SUVs fall within the prohibition created by the
literal language of the statute, but they pose many of the same dangers; they are within the
“mischief” sought to be remedied by the statute, as British lawyers would say.87  On the other
hand, these ordinances were mostly enacted before the widespread craze for SUVs, particularly
the gigantic subgenre of vehicles that weigh as much as commercial trucks.  The drafters of the
ordinances probably did not intend to target vehicles that are owned primarily for personal use. 
Moreover, the law is generally quite lenient on SUVs, granting their owners special tax breaks
and their manufacturers exemptions from passenger car fuel economy standards.88  Thus, one
could plausibly argue that the most reasonable interpretation of the ordinance would not apply to
SUVs.  
What is critical in hard cases is that the judge argue for A or B on the basis of what might
be called “internal” legal reasons, and do so in a way that is respectful of the role of law.89  In
do not subscribe to the interpretation of Hart and Sacks that assumes a single purpose lying behind a regime of legal
rules and standards.  
90  See M ICHA EL IGNA TIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL :  POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE OF TERROR 49-53 (2004)
(arguing that the rule of law does not require invariance, but does require public justification).
91  The familiar reference to “what the judge had for breakfast” as a basis for judicial decisions is a
caricature of American legal realism.  Most realists believed that judicial decisions fell into predictable patterns,
influenced by various social forces.  Only a small faction of realists argued that the reasons for judicial decisions
were completely idiosyncratic, a claim whose plausibility is undermined by the ability of lawyers to predict judicial
decisions with a fair degree of reliability.  See generally  Brian Leiter , American Legal Realism , in THE BLACK WELL
GUIDE TO PHILOSOPH Y O F LAW AND LEGA L THEORY  (Martin Golding ed. 2004).  
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order to respect the rule of law, these justifications must be based on reasons that could be
advanced publicly in an adversarial process in which reasons are given in support of one’s
position.90  It is not necessary that all interpreters agree on the result, as long as the result is
justifiable in principle on the basis of internal legal reasons.  Internal legal reasons are simply
those grounds (texts, principles that are fairly deemed to underlie and justify legal rules,
interpretive practices, hermeneutic methods, and so on) that are properly regarded in a
professional community as appropriate reasons to offer in justification of a result.  In the SUV
case, the arguments back and forth were offered on the basis of reasons such as the underlying
policies (reducing wear and tear on streets), traditional canons of statutory construction (the
mischief rule), and interpretive practices that place a single text in a broader legal context
(observing the solicitude for SUVs in environmental and tax law).  Perhaps it is most natural to
define internal legal reasons negatively, as excluding extraneous factors such as a bribe, gratitude
for a party’s support in a judicial election, information excluded by evidentiary rules, the flip of a
coin, or what the judge ate for breakfast.91  Providing a positive definition of internal legal
reasons is a major task of analytic jurisprudence, and the following Section considers how
seemingly esoteric academic debates can actually have a great deal of practical significance for
92  See MOD EL RULES, supra  note ___, Rule 3.1 ; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LA W  GOVERNING LAWYERS
§ 110 (2000); FED . R. CIV. P. 11.
93  Compare 17 C.F.R. §  205 .3(b)(2)-(3) (duty to report where  representing issuer in non-litigation context)
with 17 C.F.R. § 205.3(b)(7)(ii) (no duty to report up where lawyer retained “[t]o assert, consistent with his or her
professional obligations, a colorable defense on behalf of the issuer . . . in any investigation or judicial or
administrative proceeding relating to such evidence of a material violation”).
41
how lawyers understand their role in relation to the law.  
Before moving on to that discussion, however, it is necessary to consider a seeming
inconsistency between the demands of professionalism in litigation, on the one hand, and
transactional and counseling contexts, on the other.  In an easy case, a lawyer is not justified in
urging a court to adopt a spurious interpretation of law; neither is she permitted to structure a
transaction in order to take advantage of an illegitimate construction of applicable legal rules. 
The law governing lawyers — both the state bar disciplinary rules and the law of civil procedure
— prohibits advancing frivolous legal arguments.92  In a hard case, however, it appears to be an
implication of professionalism that a lawyer may advocate for an interpretation in litigation that
she would be prohibited from adopting as the basis for legal advice to a client or the structure of
a transaction.  This contextual distinction does exist in the law of lawyering, most notably in the
Securities and Exchange Commission’s regulations implementing the Sarbanes-Oxley act, which
require lawyers in some cases to report information “up the ladder” within a corporation where
they reasonably believe their client is committing certain wrongful acts, but do not require
reporting up where the lawyer is representing the client in litigation over the wrongful act.93  The
distinction may nevertheless be incoherent if it amounts to a requirement that the lawyer assert,
in litigation, an interpretation of the law that she would be prohibited from relying upon in
94  Thanks to  Dennis Tuchler  for raising this problem with me in correspondence.  
95  For these litigation-related duties, see MOD EL RULES, supra  note ___, Rules 3.1 (frivolous legal
arguments), 3.3(a)(1), (3) (perjury), 3.3(a)(2) (adverse legal authority), 3.4(b) (falsifying evidence).
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transactional representation.94  
It is important to note that the distinction between the transactional and litigation contexts
is not some kind of ontological or epistemological claim that the law is actually different in these
contexts or it may more easily be recovered in one setting than the other.  The applicable law and
the process of interpretation are the same in both settings.  The difference is, in hard cases, the
responsibility to serve as a custodian of the law is primarily the judge’s, with limited coordinate
duties on lawyers not to advance frivolous legal arguments, fail to disclose adverse legal
authority missed by the adversary, falsify evidence, or permit perjury to taint the record.95  The
lawyer is justified in advancing an aggressive or novel interpretation of law in litigation, as long
as there is some good faith basis for the argument, because the judge is always in a position to
reject it.  Transactional and planning situations are distinctive precisely for the lack of an
impartial referee to push back on the lawyer’s client-centered construction of the law.  The
lawyer is the sole legal interpreter and is therefore, in effect, a law-giver from the client’s point of
view.  As such, the lawyer has the power to shape the law for good or for ill.  As Spider-Man
would observe, with great power comes great responsibility, for if the lawyer does not in some
sense internalize the judicial virtues of impartiality and objectivity, the law will be distorted by
partisan zeal in a context where no neutral third party can check this tendency.  In litigation, the
lawyer’s partisan stance and greater flexibility to advance aggressive or novel interpretations of
96  See H.L.A. Hart, Postscript, in HART, supra  note ___, at 237, 247-48 [hereinafter, “Hart, Postscript”],
for this distinction, which he accuses Dworkin of blurring.  Waldron explicitly connects the problem of interpretation
with the authority of law:  “If enacted law is to settle at least some cases at the level of particularity at which they
present themselves, a rule of recognition will need to provide a basis for specifying not only which proposal, but
which version of a given proposal, has been enacted.”  WALDRON, supra  note ___, at 39.
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legal rules creates flexibility and adaptivity in the law.  If similar interpretive license were
permitted in transactional work, however, the legal system would lose some of the virtues
identified with the rule of law, such as stability, predictability, and certainty.  Legal theory must
always balance the need for growth and change with the values of stability and resistance to
manipulation.  The distinction between transactional and litigation-related representation is one
way to strike this balance.  
III. Arguments for Professionalism.
A. Identification and Interpretation of Legal Norms.  
I have been defending the view that the social function of law is the settlement of uncertainty and
normative conflict, and this requires a system of legal norms that can be identified without
reference to the truth of moral beliefs.  This is an argument about the nature of law.  Even if one
accepts this account of the nature of law, however, there can be further controversy over the law
in a given case.96  The law on a particular issue must be sufficiently determinate that the matter
may be resolved by reference to the law, rather than any of the reasons that were at stake in the
underlying normative disagreement.  The question of the identity of the law, as opposed to the
nature of law, is case-specific and interpretive.  It can be stated concisely in one of the following
97  See DENNIS PATTERSON , LA W  &  TRUTH  3 (1996).  
98 See Fiss, supra  note ___, at 742.
99  The most helpful discussions include KENT GREE NA WALT , LAW AND OBJECTIVITY  (1992); Gerald J.
Postema, Objectivity Fit for Law, in OBJECTIVITY IN LAW AND MOR ALS  99 (Brian Leiter ed. 2001); Andrei Marmor,
Three Concepts of Objectivity, in POSITIVE LAW AND OBJECTIVE VALUES 112 (2001); Jules L. Coleman & Brian
Leiter, Determinacy, Objectivity, and Authority, in LAW AND INTERPRETATION  203  (Andrei Marmor ed. 1995); JOHN
RAW LS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM  110-16 (1993) [hereinafter, “RAW LS, LIBERALISM”].
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ways:  “What does it mean to say that a proposition of law is true?”97 or “With respect to some
action, is it legally permitted?”  The controversy about the law can also be understood in terms of
criteria for the objectivity of legal decisions.  If a judge decides that there is a constitutional right
to same-sex marriage, or to obtain an abortion, or to use marijuana for the purpose of alleviating
pain, the question naturally arises whether the decision is just the judge’s subjective belief about
what the law ought to be, or whether it is in fact an accurate report on what the law is, or at least
a defensible judgment where the legal issue could have more than one plausible resolution.98 
Most attempts to understand the nature of objectivity in legal reasoning have addressed
themselves to the predicament of a judge who must decide a case, or a critic of a judicial
decision.99  If with respect to an interpretive question in law, there is an objective or determinate
right answer, range of plausible right answers, or at least a wrong answer, then it is possible to
criticize the judge from the standpoint of law, for making a mistake.  If there is no such thing as
objectivity or determinacy in law, however, the law does not provide a standpoint for criticizing
the judge.  
Lawyers, too, must worry about whether legal interpretation can be objective or
determinate, because when they act in a representative capacity, they enable or limit their clients’
100  EISENBERG, supra  note ___, at 10 (“in the vast majority of cases where  law becomes important to
private actors, as a practical matter the institution that determines the law is not the courts, but the legal profession”).
101  Richard W asserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:  Some Moral Issues, 5 HUM . RTS. 1, 7-8 (1975) (using
this example to illustrate the tension between legal entitlements and ordinary moral reasons).  
102  See Max Nathan, Jr., An Assault on the Citadel:  A Rejection of Forced Heirship , 52 TUL. L. REV. 5, 12
(1977).  None of the grounds stated would encompass Wasserstrom’s hypothetical — they cover situations such as
the child “rais[ing] his hand to strike a parent” or an adult child failing to communicate with a parent, without just
cause, for two years.  See LA. CIV. CODE art. 1621.  
103  See W ILLIAM M. MCGOVERN, JR., W ILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 3.6  (1988).  
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enjoyment of legal entitlements.100  If a client has a legal right to disinherit his son for opposing
the war in Vietnam,101 but his lawyer refuses to draft a will with this effect because of her moral
disagreement with the client’s desire, the lawyer has blocked the client’s enjoyment of a right
that the legal system would recognize if asserted — namely, the right to cut his son out of his
inheritance.  The client may be able to find another lawyer to draft the will, but regardless of
whether the client eventually gets his wish, one could ask whether the original lawyer acted
wrongly vis-à-vis the client’s legal entitlement.  The first step in that analysis would be to
ascertain the content of the law of wills.  Apparently in Louisiana a parent can disinherit a child
only for one of ten enumerated “just causes,” which must be set forth specifically in the will.102 
Unless the hypothetical occurred in Louisiana, however, the testator’s freedom is virtually
unrestricted, except by pretermitted heir statutes, which require the intent to disinherit the son to
be expressly stated in the will.103  In one of those states, the lawyer may believe her refusal to
cooperate with the client to be morally justified, and she may further believe that her moral
obligation not to assist the client outweighs her moral obligation to obey the law, but as long as
she is a competent lawyer she will not deny that the governing law would have permitted the
client to disinherit his son.  
104  Simple examples are sometimes useful to argue against the view that all legal texts present serious
problems of indeterminacy.  See BURTON, supra  note ___, at 9-10 nn.20-21 (citing extensive collection of Critical
Legal Studies sources urging that indeterminacy is a pervasive and  unavoidable aspect of legal interpretation). 
Although it is possible to overgeneralize from easy cases, it is nevertheless worth noting that there is a practically
infinite number of examples that can be offered of uncontroversial interpretation of legal norms.  See, e.g., Lawrence
B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis:  Critiquing Critical Dogma,  54 U. CHI. L. REV. 462 (1987).  The strongest
form of the indeterminacy claim — that “doctrinal inconsistency necessarily undermines the force of any
conventional legal argument” — is fairly straightforwardly refuted by stating propositions such as, “the first
paragraph of this essay does not slander Gore Vidal.”  Id. at 471-72.  Cf. PUTNAM , supra  note ___, at 116-19
(arguing against the view that interpretation is called for in every case).
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This is obviously an exceptionally simple example,104 but it illustrates what is at stake for
lawyers in the attempt to characterize objectivity in legal interpretation:  If the objectively correct
interpretation of an applicable legal norms is that the client has a right to do X, then the lawyer in
an existing lawyer-client relationship must justify her refusal to assist the client in doing X in
moral terms.  On the other hand, if one cannot say objectively that legal norms permit the client
to do X, then the lawyer has no burden to justify her refusal morally — she can appeal instead to
an interpretation of the law.  Notice that the will example assumes the lawyer is motivated not to
assist her client.  The possibility that law is indeterminate creates a different, but equally serious
ethical problem if the lawyer is motivated to do anything at all for her (presumably high-paying)
client.  If one cannot say objectively that the client is not legally entitled to do Y, and Y is a
socially harmful thing to do, then the client doing Y may cause a significant amount of harm with
the assistance of a lawyer, and there is no legal standpoint from which we can criticize the lawyer
for helping the client do Y.  The latter scenario is the conceptual problem at the heart of the
Enron collapse — we may or may not have good grounds to criticize the lawyers, from the
standpoint of legal interpretation, for their role in setting up the questionable transactions.  
In order to determine whether the Enron lawyers are subject to criticism from the point of
105  For the terminology of “core” meaning, see H.L.A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 607 (1958) (“If we are to  communicate with each other at all, and if, as in the most
elementary form of law, we are to express our intentions that a certain type of behavior be regulated by rules, then
the general words we use . . . must have some standard instance in which no doubts are felt about its application.”).  
106  HART, supra  note ___, at 124-36.
107  Id. at 126.  Another way to make this point is to distinguish between two categories of rules:  conduct
rules, which are addressed  to citizens and permit or forbid certain acts, and decision rules, which are addressed  to
officials and regulate what these officials do when they apply or interpret the law.  See Dan-Cohen, supra  note ___,
at 627.  As Dan-Cohen argues, “[t]he proper relationship between decision rules and their corresponding conduct
rules is not a logical or analytic matter.”  Id. at 629.  Rather, one must make a normative argument about the kinds of
decisions rules we want, in light of the relevant policies and values.  The position advanced in the following textual
discussion differs from Dan-Cohen’s model of the relationship  between decision rules and conduct rules in that it
does not concede the existence, as a logical matter, of a rule that can be both a conduct rule and a decision rule.  Cf.
id. at 631.   
108  This discussion is drawn from SIMON BLACKBURN, SPREADING THE WORD :  GROUNDINGS IN THE
PHILOSOPH Y O F LANGUAGE 224-29 (1984).  
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view of the law, we must first determine what the law is with respect to these transactions. 
Unlike a simple example like the railroad hypothetical, ascertaining the law in this case is not a
matter of reading unambiguous statutory language and applying the rule it announces to a case
within the core of the statute’s plain meaning.105  Finding the relevant rule is a much more
complicated interpretive exercise in most cases, because of familiar problems with the use of
verbally formulated rules to guide conduct.  In Hart’s well known formulation, legal rules have
an “open texture.”106  Rules do not determine the scope of their own application, but there must
always be something (another rule perhaps, or a conventional practice in the relevant community)
which picks out the instances of some phenomenon which fall under the rule.107  It is tempting to
respond that a legal judgment is objectively true if it corresponds with something “out there,”
like “what the law really is” in a particular case.  In general, correspondence theories of truth are
widely believed to be fatally flawed, for a number of reasons, one of which is particularly
relevant to the attempt to use correspondence as a criterion for legal objectivity.108  Suppose we
109  See ALEXANDER &  SHER WIN , supra  note ___, at 113-14.
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wish to know whether the sentence “the cat is on the mat” is true.  The correspondence theory of
truth says it is true if the sentence p (“the cat is on the mat”) corresponds to a state of affairs in
the world W (cat on mat), in some kind of appropriate correspondence-relationship C, whatever
that may be.  Schematically, we can represent this truth condition as pCW.  Now, have we got it
right?  Does p correspond to W in the right way?  This is to ask the question whether pCW itself
is true, which suggests there may be some property of the world WN to which pCW may or may
not correspond.  So pCW is true if pCWCWN.  Then it is open for us to ask whether pCWCWN is
true.  We are thus faced with an infinite regress, in which there is no foundational fact-and-
correspondence relationship about which we cannot in principle ask whether it is true. 
Something else must serve as criteria of truth, such as correspondence with other beliefs, or a
normative community practice of manifesting agreement with the speaker who utters “there is a
cat on the mat” under certain conditions.109  
In legal reasoning, if there is any vagueness, open-texture, or uncertainty in the law,
however, it is an open question whether the judgment corresponds to the law as it is.  The
sentence “the judgment corresponds to the law” is itself contestable, and the attempt to specify
truth conditions for that sentence leads us down the same path of infinite regress.  In other words,
the correspondence relationship is impossible to pin down using only the concept of
correspondence.  Something else is needed to give genuine content to the notion of a truth-
making relationship between an interpretation, on the one hand, and legal texts, practices, and
conventions, on the other.  Figuring out the nature of that “something else” has been a major
110  HART, supra  note ___, at 91-94.  Hart’s term “primitive” is perhaps unfortunate, but he uses it primarily
as a thought experiment, not a characterization of any actual human society.  A primitive legal system, as Hart uses
the term, would be a small, closely knit community in which people knew each other and shared a thick set of values,
so that they could  effectively govern themselves by simple methods of social control.  
111  Id. at 100.  
112  Scott J. Shapiro, On Hart’s Way Out, in HART’S POSTSCRIPT:  ESSAYS ON THE POSTSCRIPT TO THE 
CONCEPT OF LAW 149 , 150-53 (Jules Coleman ed. 2001) [hereinafter , “Shapiro, Hart’s Way Out”]. 
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preoccupation of analytic jurisprudence.  It is certainly an issue that arises in connection with the
argument for professionalism, because a lawyer who adheres to the Holmesian bad man position
would deny the status of “law” to the considerations I claim should be relevant to legal
interpretation by transactional lawyers.  
In jurisprudential terms, the problem can be stated in terms of Hart’s concept of a rule of
recognition.  In Hart’s account, a legal system is “mature” rather than “primitive” to the extent it
is characterized by a union of primary and secondary rules.110  Primary rules impose obligations,
create rights or permissions, and in other ways guide the day-to-day activities of citizens. 
Secondary rules, by contrast, are rules respecting what can be done with primary rules — they
provide for orderly, formal change in primary rules, permit adjudication of disputes that arise
under primary rules, and so on.  The most important of these secondary rules, which is essential
to the concept of a legal system, is a rule which provides binding criteria for legal officials who
must identify primary rules in order to interpret and apply the law.  This is the rule of
recognition.111  The structure described by Hart gives rise to a paradox, however, because the rule
of recognition cannot depend for its validity on any other rule; otherwise the infinite regress
problem would recur.112  His ingenious solution is to deny that there are legal rules or other
113  Id. at 154; HART, supra  note ___, at 116-17; Ronald Dworkin, The Model of Rules II, in TAKING RIGHTS
SERIO US LY  46, 49 (1977) [hereinafter, “Dworkin, Model II”].  
114  HART, supra  note ___, at 101-03,
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norms that require officials to follow the rule of recognition.  The rule of recognition, instead,
comes into existence because it is practiced, in the sense that officials regard it as a standard for
critically evaluating their own and others’ conduct.113  The convergence by officials on a standard
for identifying legal norms, and the internal attitude that officials take toward the rule as a reason
for action, are the criteria for legality, not any further rule whose credentials as a legal rule would
themselves stand in need of certification by the rule of recognition.  
Because it is a product of conventional behavior by officials and the attitude of
acceptance of the rule as a guide to conduct, the rule of recognition need not be formally
expressed as a rule, or written down in any authoritative legal document.114  Thus, one might
wonder whether legal judgments can be objective, if they have no foundation other than social
practices.  Specifically in regard to this Article, one might wonder whether the interpretive stance
of professionalism is validated as a legal standard by the applicable rule of recognition, whether
it is just my subjective policy preference or, as a third possibility, whether it is an objectively
binding principle of legal interpretation that is not validated by the rule of recognition.  It is
important at this juncture not to overstate the requirements for a judgment to be objective.  Even
a strong conception of objectivity need not require something like Platonic forms or
correspondence with the fabric of the universe to underwrite the truth of a proposition.  Rather,
objectivity in law need be only moderately domain-specific, meaning that the characteristics of as
115  See Postema, supra  note ___, at 100.  
116  Id. at 105-09; see also  Fiss, supra  note ___, at 744 (objectivity implies that an interpretation can be
measured against a  set of norms that transcend the judging subject); RAW LS, LIBERALISM , supra  note ___, at 110-12.
117  HART, supra  note ___, at 102.  
118  Id. at 103-04.  
119  Id. at 109-10. 
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an objective judgment in the natural sciences will differ in some respects from that which makes
a judgment objective in art criticism, basketball officiating, or faculty hiring decisions.115  An
objective judgment in any endeavor must have certain characteristics:  (1) independence from the
subjectivity of the judging subject, openness to the subject matter, and willingness to base
judgments on the subject itself, not personal idiosyncracies; (2) amenability to evaluation of the
correctness of judgments, or standards for assessing judgments; and (3) invariance across judging
subjects.116  A decision to follow norm that is capable of serving as a Hartian rule of recognition
satisfies these criteria — in Hart’s words a political official “manifests acceptance” of the rule of
recognition,117 acknowledging that whether a norm counts as a rule of recognition is independent
of the subjectivity of the official.  The official also acknowledges that the rule of recognition is a
product of the shared acceptance of the norm, which indicates acceptance of standards for
evaluating the correctness of this judgment.  Finally, there must be a high degree of invariance in
officials’ acceptance of the norm, or there would be a general collapse in the efficacy of the legal
system.118  As Hart recognized, there may be some  disagreement at the margins of a rule of
recognition, but as long as there is a “normally concordant” practice of identifying law with
reference to certain criteria, one exists.119
120  Id. at 110.  Dworkin criticizes Hart for arguing that social rules are constituted  by behavior while
admitting that rules can be uncertain at the margins.  Dworkin, Model II, supra  note ___, at 54.  The Hartian
distinction between the core and penumbra of rules can explain this apparent anomaly, because the core of a rule of
recognition will exist as long as it works most of the time, with only a few marginal uncertainties.  
121  Id. at 150 (“Which form of omnipotence . . . our Parliament enjoys is an empirical question concerning
the rule which is accepted as the ultimate criterion in identifying the law.”).  
122  Ronald Dworkin, The M odel of Rules I, in TAKING RIGHTS SERIO US LY  14, 24 (1977) [hereinafter
“Dworkin, Model I”].
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For Hart, whether a rule of recognition exists is an empirical question.120  The content of
the rule of recognition is an empirical question as well.121  One can ascertain the existence and
content of a rule of recognition by reading cases, doing legal sociology, or some other method
appropriate to discovering facts about a community’s practices.  The argument in this Section
might be restated in these terms, as a claim that the prescribed attitude of professionalism is in
fact law, and that this fact can be proven by studying the interpretive practices of lawyers and
judges in a number of related areas.  In a different vein, one might make a critical or normative
argument about the rule of recognition — namely, that it ought to recognize a principle or
standard as a part of the law.  The normative argument in this case would maintain that the legal
system would be better if the attitude of professionalism were a feature of the law, not an
aspiration for lawyers or an obligation of ordinary morality. 
B. Descriptive Arguments:  The Case of Tax Shelters.
Interpretive practices by judges, lawyers, legislators, and scholars frequently make
reference to principles to justify a conclusion that X is a true proposition of law.  In contrast with
rules, which have a binary, all-or-nothing character,122 principles are characterized by being
123  Id. at 26-27.  In his response to Dworkin contained in the Postscript to The Concept of Law, Hart refers
to this feature of principles as their “non-conclusive” character.  Hart, Postscript, supra  note ___, at 261.  He argues
that Dworkin exaggerates this distinction between rules and principles, and that there are many instances in which
two legal rules conflict and one is held to outweigh the other.  Hart also points out that in cases where a principle
conflicts with a rule and the principle prevails, the rule is not abandoned.  Id. at 262.  
124  Dworkin, Model I, supra  note ___, at 35, 44; Dworkin, Hard Cases, supra  note ___, at 85, 115.  Hart
contended that judges exercise law-making power in cases that lay far out in the penumbra of rules.  See HART, supra
note ___, at 135, 145.  
125  Dworkin argues that principles do not have the same pedigree as judicial decisions and statutes —
rather, they are a  product of a “sense of appropriateness developed in the profession.”  Dworkin, Model I , supra  note
___, at 40.   Hart responds that there is no reason why principles cannot be identified by pedigree criteria, “in that
they have been consistently invoked by courts in ranges of different cases as providing reasons for decision.”  Hart,
Postscript, supra  note ___, at 265. 
126  Gordon, Hired Guns, supra  note ___, at 48.
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reasons in support of a judge’s decision, but not conclusive reasons in the way that rules are. 
Two principles can conflict, and one can outweigh another, while both remain parts of the legal
system; by contrast, when two rules conflict, one of the rules must persist while the other is
abandoned.123  Principles in the Dworkinian sense are not the kind of extra-legal moral arguments
that one might make to criticize the law for being wrongheaded; rather, they exist within the law
and can serve as a link in the chain of an internal justificatory argument.124  Because they are part
of the law, lawyers can no more ignore these principles than they can omit express statutory or
common-law rules from their reasoning process.125  In addition, lawyers appeal to extra-legal
norms constraining their interpretive activities.  These are not Dworkinian principles in the sense
of being part of the law itself, but are an aspect of an attitude of respect adopted toward the law
and legal interpretation.  “[I]n most contexts lawyers can fairly readily tell the difference between
making good-faith efforts to comply with a plausible interpretation of the purposes of a legal
regime, and using every ingenuity of his or her trade to resist or evade compliance.”126  Indeed,
these extra-legal norms regulating interpretation must be outside the domain of substantive legal
127  See Gordon, New Role, supra  note ___, at 1194-97.  David Luban argues that H olmes invented his
image of the lawyer advising a “bad man” client in order to make a jurisprudential point about the separability of law
and morality.  See David Luban, The Bad Man and the G ood Lawyer:  A Centennial Essay on Holmes’s The Path of
the Law, 72 NYU L. REV. 1547, 1562 (1997).  Holmes can therefore be understood as making the same point as
Dworkin —  if a norm is not part of the legal system, a judicial decision based on that norm is not legitimate from the
point of view of a client who is bound by it.  Dworkin’s response, of course, is very different from Holmes’s, for
instead of insisting on a bright-line separation of law and morality, Dworkin enthusiastically incorporates morality
into law. 
128  See, e.g., William Schwarzer, Sanctions Under the New Federal Rule 11 — A Closer Look,  104 F.R.D.
181 (1985).
129  See supra notes ___ - ___, and accompanying text.  
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rules and principles, because any substantive legal norm, whether a rule or a principle, will stand
in need of interpretation and the process of interpretation must be constrained by some sort of
regulative norms.  These extra-legal regulative norms are what I have been calling attitudes or
stances taken by officials, and quasi-officials such as lawyers, toward the law.  
The opposing argument from the Holmesian bad man perspective is that a lawyer need
not counsel and assist the client within the bounds of law as defined by “good faith efforts” and
“plausible” interpretations — rather, the lawyer need only respect “arguable” or “non-frivolous”
constructions of legal norms.127  Which of these interpretive stances is the right one to take
toward legal norms?  One way to answer this question is to see whether courts require clients to
arrange their affairs to comply with the law interpreted in light of substantive principles, values,
and social interests.  Once we frame the question in these terms, we can derive support for the
attitude of professionalism from a number of analogous areas of law.  Although there are
numerous examples that could be offered, including the law of frivolous litigation128 and the
implicit norms of good faith dealing observed in various commercial communities,129 I will
concentrate on the economic substance doctrine in the law of taxation.  
130  Isenbergh, supra  note ___, at 863; David A. W eisbach, Formalism in the Tax Law,  66 U. CHI. L. REV.
860, 860 (1999) (“taxpayers have been able to manipulate the rules endlessly to produce results clearly not intended
by the drafters”); David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAX LAW . 235, 236 (1999)
(noting that tax lawyers have tried to  device rules so  that “business transactions do not permit some taxpayers to
avoid tax at the expense of others in a way that was not intended by the  political system”).  
131  Alan Gunn, Tax Avoidance, 76 MICH . L. REV. 733, 735 (1978).
132  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:  An Econom ic Analysis , 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992);
Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685 (1976); Weisbach,
supra  note ___.
133  See FREDERICK SCHAUER , PLAYING BY THE RULES:  A  PHILOS OP HICA L EXAM INATION OF RULE-BASED
DECISIONMAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE 53-55 (1991) [hereinafter “SCHAUER , PLAYING BY THE RULES”].  The
terminology of background justification, and the driver’s license example, are from a contemporaneous article by
Schauer.  See Schauer, Rule of Law, supra  note ___, at 648-49; see also  Schauer, Statutory Construction, supra  note
___, at 236.  Significantly, the phenomenon of divergence between the result mandated by a general rule and what
would be required after full attention to all the relevant features of a situation is not limited to following legal rules. 
A similar dynamic exists in moral philosophy; indeed, a well known criticism of Kantian ethics is that the emphasis
by Kant on moral rules distorts the nature of moral judgment by directing an agent to ignore morally relevant details
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One of the recurring problems in the law of taxation is that the tax laws may be defeated
through manipulation, that is, by structuring transactions in a way that creates artificial tax
consequences.130  The difficult analytical question is obviously how to define “manipulation” or
“artificial,” and this question only arises because it is possible for a transaction to comply with
formal legal norms while somehow failing to satisfy the substantive standards or principles that
those formal norms attempt to express.  The difficulty is perhaps particularly acute in tax law,
which supposedly does not concern itself with whether the taxpayers intent in entering into a
transaction was to avoid taxes,131 but it must be faced in any complex regulatory arena in which a
client may seek the assistance of a lawyer to avoid a legal prohibition or penalty through careful
planning.  The danger of manipulation results from the familiar dichotomy between form and
substance, or rules and standards, in legal norms.132  Briefly, the distinction depends on the
conceptual possibility of divergence between the action mandated (or prohibited) by a rule and
the action mandated (or prohibited) by the rule’s background justification.133  A legal norm in the
of a problem.  See HERMAN , supra  note ___, at 74-75.
134  SCHAUER , PLAYING BY THE RULES, supra  note ___, at 135-66; Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a
Law of Rules,  56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989). 
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form of a rule permitting only people age 16 or older to obtain a driver’s license is plainly
justified by reasons of public safety, but the is both overinclusive and underinclusive with respect
to this background justification.  The rule may prevent mature, careful 15 year-olds from driving
(overinclusiveness) as well as permitting reckless, dangerous 20 year-olds to obtain a license
(underinclusiveness).  One response to this problem is to permit a decisionmaker to rely directly
on the background justification, by casting the norm in the form of a standard.  In our example,
the relevant norm expressed as a standard might be that only competent, mature drivers may
obtain a license.  
The distinction between rules and standards creates two sets of mirror-image risks facing
the regulator.  Expressing a norm in a standard-like way entails the loss of benefits associated
with rules, such as ease of application, error reduction, constraint on the decisionmaker’s
discretion (and therefore power), and especially values of ex ante predictability and certainty of
application.134  By contrast, expressing the norm in a rule-like way entails the loss of the benefits
associated with standards, such as sensitivity to the fit between the outcome of the legal decision
and the background justification of the norm, and greater ex post contextualization and
particularization of the result, resulting in a more just result as between the parties.  In tax law,
rules are generally favored for the additional reason that many transactions are structured
carefully in order to capture tax benefits, even if the tax treatment of the given transaction was
135  See, e.g., Yosha v. Commissioner, 861 F.2d 494 , 498 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (“There is no rule
against taking advantage of opportunities created by Congress or the T reasury Department for beating taxes. . . . 
Many transactions are largely or even entire ly motivated by the desire to obtain a tax advantage.”); Hariton, supra
note ___, at 237 (noting the general presumption that the taxpayer “should not be denied beneficial tax results which
she stumbles upon, or even seeks out, in the course of her legitimate business dealings, even if those results are
obviously unanticipated, unintended, or downright undesirable”).  
136  Hariton, supra  note ___, at 236
137  Mark P. Gergen, The Common Knowledge of Tax Abuse, 54 SMU L. REV. 131, 136 (2001).
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never foreseen or intended.135  Given the sensitivity of transactional structure to tax
consequences, there seems to be a heightened need for predictability in tax law as opposed to,
say, tort law, where many actors are less likely to be influenced by the precise form of legal
norms.  Still, there must be limits on the extent to which the formal (or rule-based) treatment of a
transaction can diverge from the substantive (or standard-based) approach — too great a
divergence and the system will be unfair as between similarly situated taxpayers.136  There is
accordingly great pressure to differentiate between real transactions, undertaken in the ordinary
course of a taxpayer’s business for legitimate business purposes, and the artificial transactions,
with all their Rube Goldberg complexity, set up with no purpose other than to generate tax
benefits. 
One way to distinguish between real and artificial transactions and their tax consequences
is to rely on the informed judgment of members of the relevant professional community.  As
Mark Gergen observes, “[g]ood tax lawyers know when they are pushing hard at the edge of the
envelope.”137  After observing the difficulty in arriving at determinate standards of tax motive
and economic substance, which would enable courts to deny a positive result to a taxpayer who
had complied formally with the rules, he falls back on professional judgment to formulate a
138  Id. at 138.
139  Peter C. Canellos, A Tax Practitioner’s Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in
Structuring  Business Transactions and in Tax Shelters , 54 SMU L. REV. 47, 51-52 (2001) (“experienced tax
professionals can usually readily distinguish tax shelters from real transactions”).  
140  Id. at 50.  
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“disclaimer” that could be attached to any analysis of form and substance in tax law:
A determination that an action is tax motivated or insubstantial is neither a
necessary nor a sufficient condition for denying a positive tax result to which the
actor claims he is entitled under tax law.  There may be other grounds for rejecting
the actor’s position.  These standards do not displace other forms of reasoning. 
Further, some tax motivated or insubstantial actions are respected.  As for which
are respected and which are not, that is difficult to say.  Do not always expect to
find a rule or principle to sort them out.  In a novel case the best guide may well
be professional common knowledge.138
Similarly, tax lawyer Peter Canellos claims that everyone in the relevant community knows the
difference between creative tax planning and bogus tax shelters, even though shelters are
designed to mimic real transactions.139  In tax sheltering, “promoters attempt to apply a patina of
substance to a transaction that is formal and unreal,” while legitimate tax practitioners plan real
business transactions with a business purpose, in light of the possibility of obtaining tax
advantages.”140  As Canellos recognizes, all of these terms are subject to a challenge that they be
defined more precisely — what makes a transaction real or unreal?  what is the difference
between a patina of substance and creative structuring?  The answers cannot be given by ever
more elaborate rules, however.  Professional judgment is an irreducible aspect of the analysis,
even though it may be possible to set out some standards or criteria that are germane to the
141  Id. at 53-54 (“Although in theory the line between a tax shelter and an aggressively structured real
transaction may appear difficult to draw, in actuality the distinction is rather easy to establish when the transaction
involves most of the tax shelter elements described above.”).  
142  In the tax context see Isenbergh, supra  note ___, at 882 (“It is not uncommon for professors to regard —
and teach —  the process of legal interpretation as a vehicle for their own aesthetic preferences”); ACM Partnership
v. Commissioner, 157 F.3d 231, 265 (3d Cir. 1998) (McKee, J., dissenting) (I can’t help but suspect that the
majority’s conclusion . . . is, in its essence, something akin to a ‘smell test.’”).  In legal theory generally, see Farber,
Inevitability, supra  note ___, at 541-47 (summarizing critiques).
143  Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring).  For an interesting, sympathetic
interpretation of Justice Stewart’s reasoning, see Paul Gewirtz, On “I Know It When I See It” , 105 YALE L.J. 1023
(1996).  Gewirtz’s essay is a defense of what he calls nonrational elements of judicial reasoning, such as judgment
and character, and I think he is correct that these qualities can be described as excellences or virtues.  See id. at 1033.
144  Postema, supra  note ___, at 105-09.
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exercise of judgment.141  
Appeals to professional judgment lead to a predictable reaction — charges of
unprincipled decisionmaking, arbitrariness, non-transparency, and a departure from the ideal of
objectivity in law.142  Critics are apt to cite, disparagingly, Justice Stewart’s comment about hard-
core pornography, that he cannot define it, but he knows it when he sees it.143  But recall the
previous discussion of judgment and objectivity.  A judgment in this domain (e.g. “that is a tax
shelter, not a legitimate transaction”) can be objective as long as the decisionmaker is willing to
base judgments on the subject itself, not personal idiosyncracies; is willing to be open to
evaluation of the correctness of her judgment; and makes a decision that exhibits some degree of
invariance across judging subjects.144  This kind of limited domain-specific objectivity can be
secured by constraining all-things-considered contextual judgments with more specific criteria
which are developed over a series of analogous cases.  In the tax example, the taxpayer will not
be denied tax benefits as long as the transaction has a legitimate business purpose.  This standard
145  Canellos, supra  note ___, at 51-55
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can be defined further based on criteria such as:  
C the way the transaction was marketed and sold — i.e. whether it was pitched by
specialized tax professionals and marketed to the tax or finance department of a
corporation, or was it developed by outside investment advisors or internal operations
departments and marketed in terms of business or financing opportunities, not tax
savings; 
C the involvement of real or extraneous parties — i.e. whether it included real buyers and
sellers, with financing at market rates, or accommodation parties such as foreign
subsidiaries or partnerships;
C the use of a series of highly choreographed steps; and 
C whether the workings of the transaction are concealed (and thus reliant upon the audit
lottery) or publicly disclosed.145
Assuming that these evaluative criteria are generally shared within the relevant community, the
judgment of legitimate business purpose is sufficiently objective.  
It is my belief that criteria similar to those for economic substance in taxation could be
developed in any area of practice, in consultation with specialists in the substantive law, and it is
my contention that the professionalism demands that lawyers understand their counseling and
advising role as mandating the use of criteria such as these.  My principal aim in this Article is
not to generate specific criteria, like the ones above for identifying abusive tax planning, but to
lay the jurisprudential groundwork for the prescription that lawyers ought to think about their
roles in this way.  The task of developing criteria for the exercise of judgment would then be a
task for conscientious lawyers in various areas of practice.  Up to this point, however, the
146  See id. at 55-57; see also  Joseph Bankman, The Business Purpose Doctrine and the Sociology of Tax,
54 SMU L. REV. 149, 150 (2001) (elaborating on Canellos’s sociological analysis of the two tax bars). 
147  See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN , THE LOST LAWYER  (1993).  
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arguments have been descriptive only, insofar as they have shown that in at least one area of law,
it is possible to conceptualize practice in accordance with the professionalism.  The task for the
following subsection is to demonstrate that this style of practice is mandatory.  
I am hedging here a bit with the term “relevant” community.  Canellos’s article on tax
shelters identifies two vastly different communities of practitioners — the tax bar and the tax
shelter bar.146   “Real” tax practitioners structure transactions that are otherwise legitimate in a
way that maximizes tax advantages; they are concerned with their reputation and status, and
often become involved with high-profile organizations such as the tax sections of the ABA and
the New York State Bar Association, which are dedicated to improving the tax law.  They
consider exercising professional judgment as a stock in trade.  (This description, particularly the
elitism and emphasis on the exercise of judgment, calls to mind Anthony Kronman’s lawyer-
statesman.147)  Tax shelter practitioners, on the other hand, set up artificially contrived deals, care
little about their reputation for probity and judgment, and provide legal opinions as a fig leaf for
sheltering transactions that are widely derided as flimflam by real practitioners.  So which of
these is the relevant community?  If we specific real tax practitioners and then derive evaluative
criteria from their shared norms, are we not engaging in circular reasoning?  The shared norms of
the tax shelter bar and the criteria they would generate for identifying abusive transactions would
presumably look very different from those listed above.  But why follow the interpretive
148  See ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES 45-60 (1999) (discussing the possibility that
even if the role of doctor were constituted with certain obligations, a practitioner might opt to become a “schmoctor”
with different obligations, and that the concept of a role  canno t prevent this kind of maneuver); Katharine T. Bartlett,
Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 855 (1990) (arguing that there are multiple, overlapping
communities to which one may belong, and that privileging  the dominant community tends to preserve the status
quo).  
149  Fiss, supra  note ___, at 746.
150  Social pressures may prevent a lawyer from opting in to a community that is perceived to be abusive,
from the standpoint of the interests of elite practitioners.  This can be a good thing or it can be a  bad thing.  It is a
good thing if the prospect of incurring shame or even being ostracized motivates a lawyer to maintain respect for the
law and  not assist clients in evading it.  It is a bad thing, however, if social norms compel the lawyer’s membership
in a community that is not dedicated to respecting the  law. 
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principles of the tax bar, not the tax shelter bar?  Or, why regard oneself as a member of the
interpretive community that is constituted by fidelity to those norms?  In theory, a lawyer may
decide to remove herself from the tax bar and join the tax shelter bar, which recognizes a
different set of standards of interpretation.148  Even if the authority of a community’s disciplining
rules do not depend on assent to those norms,149 it seems open to practitioners to opt out of the
community and opt into a different community, with a different set of disciplining rules.150  
A different way to frame this objection might be to claim that the requirement of
professionalism in interpretation only gains authority by bootstrapping.  That is, my claim is that
the obligation imposed by the attitude of professionalism is a function of the relevant interpretive
community and the standards it recognizes for evaluating the correctness of legal judgments (i.e.
“although purely formal norms seem to permit X, the law as correctly interpreted prohibits X”). 
At the same time, I seem to be claiming that a lawyer ought to associate himself with the
interpretive community that recognizes the attitude of professionalism and shun other
communities that do not.  What is the source of this meta-obligation?  If the response were, “the
151  Cf. Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, In Hell There Will Be Lawyers Without Clients or Law, in
ETHICS IN PRACTICE:  LAWYERS’ ROLES, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND REGULATION  177, 180 (Deborah L. Rhode ed. 2000)
(“Good lawyers understand that the ethical practice of law involves lawyers simultaneously shaping legal boundaries
and recognizing the real limits to this manipulation.”).
152  Gordon, Hired Guns, supra  note ___, at 45.
153  I am indebted  to Dennis Tuchler  for pressing me to consider this problem.  
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obligation of professionalism,” that would indeed be bootstrapping.  But the correct response is
given instead in terms of the social function of law:  A relatively stable, determinate framework
of legal rights and obligations is necessary to permit ordered cooperation among people who
disagree on just about everything except the need to reach settlement of disagreements.  If
lawyers were permitted to adopt a Holmesian bad man interpretive attitude (or to opt into a
community which recognized that attitude as a proper interpretation of the relevant law), then the
law would end up having no boundaries at all, no constraining capacity, and therefore no ability
to create authoritative settlement.  This conclusion may sound unduly apocalyptic, but experience
with practices such as tax sheltering shows that lawyers can always plan around formal legal
norms, given sufficient resources and creativity.  Purely formal constraints such as legislation,
rulemaking, and enhanced enforcement will never be sufficient to eliminate abuses because
lawyers are involved in constructing the bounds of the law.151  As Robert Gordon rightly
observes, there are resources for strategic manipulation within any set of adjudicative or
administrative rules and procedures.152  As a result, the effectiveness of the law depends on
constraints that are exogenous to formal legal norms.  The following Subsection develops this
argument further.  
Before moving on, however, it is necessary to consider one final objection.153  I have been
154  HART, supra  note ___, at 108-09.  
155  Solan, supra  note ___, at ___.  
156  Id. at ___.
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talking about “the community” and its interpretive practices as if it were a thing to which an
intention can be straightforwardly ascribed.  In one sense, this is just a convenient fiction —
communities don’t have practices or disciplining rules, community members follow these norms. 
The community’s standards can be located by observing convergent behavior by community
members,154 but the community itself is not an intentional being.  On the other hand we speak
quite naturally of collective intentions and norms and attribute these mental states to a group.155 
In this case, we mean literally that the group intends something and are no longer using collective
intention as a metaphor.  Moreover, we do so even in the absence of some formal procedure,
such as taking a poll, which we could use to discern the intentions of individuals and aggregate
them into a collective intention.  Without formal procedures we may reach a premature and
incorrect conclusion about the group’s intention,156 so an ascription of group intention must be
regarded as potentially revisable, but talking as though the group has an intention is not
incoherent.  In the example here, it may turn out that the elite tax bar is more tolerant of tax
shelters than its more outspoken members would admit.  This, however, is an empirical challenge
to the norms of a particular group, not a conceptual impediment to the general practice of
imputing intentions to a collective body.  
C. Normative Arguments:  Public Justifiability.
157  HART, supra  note ___, at 151.  
158  Id. at 154.  As Coleman reconstructs Dworkin’s argument against Hart’s social rules thesis, “if there  is
substantial controversy [over the content of the rule of recognition], then there cannot be convergence of behavior
sufficient to specify a social rule.”  Coleman, Negative and Positive, supra  note ___, at 15.
159  See FINNIS, supra  note ___, at 14-15.  
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Descriptive arguments cannot settle with finality the question of whether the attitude of
professionalism is a part of our legal system.  One could read every case and conduct exhaustive
empirical sociological research and never know the answer for sure.  There are two reasons for
this.  The first is that the rule of recognition, like any legal rule, is characterized by its open
texture.157  There may be a situation in which there is factual uncertainty regarding the content of
the rule of recognition, and in that situation some institution will be called upon to make an
unconstrained choice about the specific contours of the ultimate rule for identifying law.  There
are no rules requiring one result or another — as Hart puts it, “at the fringe of these very
fundamental things, we should welcome the rule-sceptic.”158  The second is the by-now familiar
infinite regress problem.  No amount of rules and meta-rules can settle an interpretive question
with finality.  Hart grounded the rule of recognition in social practices to avoid the regress
problem, and we might take the same way out with respect to professionalism.  A more
promising approach, however, would be to give an extra-legal justification for it — one which is
based on the nature and function of law, and therefore the reasons for treating legal directives as
authoritative.  
Philosophers of law ask the conceptual question “what distinguishes law from other
means of social ordering?”159 for a reason — the function of law is to do a distinctive kind of
160  See Coleman, Negative and Positive, supra  note ___, at 9-10 (explaining that this account of legal
positivism is probably Dworkin’s target in The M odel of Rules I, but that there is another characteristic of positivism,
namely its conventionalism, that is plausible).  
161  Id. at 15-16.  
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work, as compared with other means of securing social order.  My claim has been that the
function of law is to secure the conditions necessary for cooperation and the realization of
collective goods, notwithstanding deep and persistent disagreement over values, ends,
conceptions of the good, and the application of moral principles to practical situations.  In order
to do this work, law must have certain characteristics.  It is tempting to say that the law must be
uncontroversial,160 but in anything outside the core of the application of legal norms, common
experience shows that the law is anything but uncontroversial.  In any event, the requirement that
the law be uncontroversial is usually interpreted as a requirement that a legal system’s rule of
recognition be capable of formulation without reference to the content of moral principles, and
this requirement does not preclude the use in legal reasoning of moral principles that have
become incorporated into legal norms.161  Preclusion of the content of moral norms is necessary
to avoid slipping back into the disagreement that required authoritative settlement by law.  But
the preclusion of non-legal considerations that is the consequence of the negative aspect of
professionalism requires a lawyer to exclude moral principles from her interpretive process only
to the extent those principles are not recognized as part of law by the relevant interpretive
community.  In addition, the positive aspect of professionalism requires that a lawyer’s
interpretive judgment be guided, in the end, by the social function of law, which is to provide a
secure framework for coordinated action.  For this reason, interpretive communities have
evolved, and ought to evolve, higher-order standards for differentiating artificial, abusive
162  See generally  ROSALIND HURSTHOUSE , ON V IRTUE ETHICS 170-91 (1999); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
WHOSE JUSTICE?   WHOSE RATIONALITY? 124-45 (1988); J.L. Ackrill, Aristotle on Eudaim onia , in ESSAYS ON
ARISTO TLE’S ETHICS 15 (Amélie O ksenberg Rorty ed. 1980).  
163  See MACINTYRE, AFTER V IRTUE, supra  note ___, at 186-96. 
164  See KRIPKE, supra  note ___, at 92.  See also  HERMAN , supra  note ___, at 83-84 (discussing rules of
moral salience, which specify features of a situation that are relevant to the exercise of moral judgment, and noting
that not just any rules count as rules of moral salience); Schauer, Statutory Construction, supra  note ___, at 251
(members of linguistic communities not only share the ability to make sense of utterances, but do the same things
with linguistic understandings).
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transactions that comply only formally with legal rules from those transactions that comply
substantially with the law.  
The reason to favor the interpretive principles of the tax bar, instead of the tax shelter bar,
is that the former does better vis-à-vis the social function of the law.  The choice of that
community’s norms is not an aesthetic response or a standardless attempt to privilege one
standpoint over another.  Rather, the foundational question — which community’s norms? — is
answered with reference to purposive or teleological standards.  The analogy in moral philosophy
is Aristotelian virtue ethics, in which character, virtue, and the exercise of judgment (practical
wisdom, or phronesis) are prior to evaluations of right and wrong, and moral virtues are known
to be virtues because they conduce to the final good for humans, eudaimonia.162  As long as there
is agreement on the final end of an activity or practice, it is possible to define virtues as those
characteristics that enable one to better realize the ends of that practice.163  Kripke’s interpretation
of Wittgenstein makes a similar point in a different way, noting that for utterances to be said to
conform to a rule, they must not only conform to assertability conditions, but also that there is
some point, within the community of language-users, of making this type of utterance under
these conditions.164  
165  EISENBERG, supra  note ___, at 11 (“G ranted  that it is desirable for  lawyers as well as judges to be able
to determine the law, it becomes critical that lawyers should be able to replicate the process of judicial reasoning.”).
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Thus, the reasons for regarding the law as authoritative over some issue gives a reason for
incorporating the interpretive understandings of a particular community.  These principles in turn
can supply criteria for differentiating legitimate from bogus interpretations of formal legal norms. 
The reason for treating the law as authoritative is that it does a better job than uncoordinated
individual action at facilitating peaceful social interaction and cooperation against a background
of persistent conflict and disagreement.  In order for the law to facilitate private ordering,
however, it must be relatively stable and determinate; and in order for law to be stable and
determinate, the lawyers who interpret and apply the law to their clients’ situations must interpret
the law in a way that reflects the public meaning it would likely have if interpreted by a legal
official such as a judge or administrative law judge.165  This means that a lawyer cannot interpret
the law applying to complex, undisclosed transactions differently, merely because the
transactions are secret; the appropriate normative stance one must take toward the law assumes
that the facts of the transaction are being evaluated by a competent regulator who is fully
informed on the applicable facts and law.  
I suppose a lawyer could reply that she is unconcerned with the effective functioning of
the law, which is a problem for legislators, rulemakers, or judges, but not for her or her client.  If
those “others” were unable to make the law fully effective, so much the worse for them, but it is
of no moment to the lawyer or her client.  This attitude, however, would be self-defeating —
even irrational in the narrow means-ends sense.  Again picking up on an argument by Robert
166  Id. at 49; Gordon, New Role, supra  note ___, at 1198-99.  
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Gordon, the response to this lawyer is that she must be concerned about the effective functioning
of the law, because without it, neither she nor her client could realize her own interests.  The
market economy presupposes a background of stable law, custom, and enforcement that enforces
private ordering.166  Even if a lawyer and client were concerned only with pursuing their own
narrow self-interest, paradoxically it is only possible to behave self-interestedly within a
framework of other-regarding obligations.  A lawyer might evade regulatory requirements by
aggressive structuring of transactions in one case, but cause long-run damage in the form of
eroding the capability of the legal system to facilitate the functioning of financial markets.  The
lawyer cannot be indifferent to this long-term damage and still claim to be making an ethical
argument about the obligations of her role, because it is in the nature of ethical arguments that
they must be generalizable to relevantly similar situations.  It may be true that a lawyer could
game the system once without causing catastrophic damage, but this would constitute
impermissible free-riding on the cooperation of others.  Thus, any plausible ethical argument —
i.e. one that is worthy of the respect of similarly situated others — must take account of the
consequences of widespread manipulation of formal legal norms.  
IV. The Enron Lawyers:  Creative, Aggressive, and Professional, or Creative, Aggressive,
and Unprofessional?
Enron had a problem.  It had an ambitious plan for growth that required billions of dollars
in cash, but it could not raise cash through conventional methods like selling stock or borrowing
from banks.  The reason was simple — additional borrowing would harm its credit rating and
167  Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 36-37; Second Batson Report, supra  note 1 , at 15-22; M CLEAN &
ELKIND , supra  note 1 , at 92-94, 150-51, 154-55, 161, 236-37, 296, 318; Frank Partnoy, A Revisionist View of Enron
and the Sudden Death of “May” , 48 VILL. L. REV. 1245, 1250 (2003) (“The key factor sustaining Enron’s ability to
secure a low cost of capital was its investment grade credit rating . . . which the major credit rating agencies gave to
Enron’s debt from 1995 until November 2001 .”); Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note ___, at 1309-10. 
168  Baird & Rasmussen, supra  note 1 , at 1792-94; Bratton, Dark Side, supra  note 1, at 1299-1300.
169  Mark-to-market accounting permits a company to book as revenue the entire estimated value of a stream
of income from an asset.  Cash will continue to flow in the door over the entire productive life of the asset, but all of
the revenue will be realized in the quarter in which it was booked.  Not only was this method highly susceptible to
abuse in the form of fiddling with the estimated value of an asset, but it also amplifies the pressure from Wall Street
to show continuing growth.  Because realizing all the future profits when the asset is booked makes one quarter’s
revenue figures look good, it makes it that much harder to  show growth in the subsequent quarter.  See generally
Second Batson Report, supra  note 1, at 22-28 (mark-to-market accounting can create a “quality of earnings”
problem, because earnings are recognized long before the activity generates any cash); id. at 29-32 (transaction to
provide video on demand, with content supplied by Blockbuster, resulted in recognized gain of $53 million, even
though Enron did not have the technology to deliver the content, which B lockbuster in any event could not ob tain
from the studios); M CLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1, at 39-41, 126-29; Bala G. Dharan, Testimony, in Lessons
Learned from Enron’s Collapse:  Auditing the Accounting Industry — Report of the House Committee on Energy
and Commerce, H .R. Doc. No. 107-83, at 87 (Feb. 6, 2002) (mark-to-market accounting, as applied to private
contracts for the sale of assets that do not have readily ascertainable market values, requires a great deal of guess
work and assumptions about dozens of variables); James S. Chanos, Testimony, in id., at 76 (under mark-to-market
accounting, if assumptions are not borne out and assets actually decline in value, the reporting company must adjust
their book value downward, but in practice there is a powerful incentive to do new deals and book the value of those
new deals, using questionable assumptions, to mask the effect of the previous decline in asset values); Bratton, Dark
Side, supra  note 1, at 1303-04 (no market sets values for over-the-counter derivatives, so values must be obtained
from economic models; since Enron was at the cutting edge of creating new derivative products, generally accepted
approaches to valuation did not exist); Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note ___, at 1309 n.2 (quoting e-mail
communication between an accounting professor at Duke’s business school and the author, a highly sophisticated
scholar of structured finance, which incidentally illustrates how complex these transactions can be).  
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issuing additional equity would hurt the price of its stock, which would be unthinkable in a
company driven by the need to constantly increase its share price.167  The markets it had created,
in natural gas and wholesale electricity, were maturing and profits from trading were diminishing
in response to increasing competition.168  Moreover, the insistence by Jeffrey Skilling that the
company use mark-to-market accounting placed tremendous pressure on corporate managers to
show constant revenue growth, even if that meant sacrificing cash flow.169  These incentives
explain the motivation for most of the convoluted transactions devised by Chief Financial Officer
Andy Fastow.  Fastow’s innovation, if you can call it that, was to use techniques of structured
170  Structured finance techniques can be used for legitimate business purposes, such as enabling a company
to obtain lower-cost financing, transferring risk to parties who are better able to evaluate it, and permitting the owner
of illiquid but valuable assets to use them to obtain financing.  See, e.g., Steven  L. Schwarcz, The Alchemy of Asset
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. &  FIN . 133 (1994) [hereinafter, “Schwarcz, Alchemy”]; Dharan, supra  note ___, at
92-93.
171  See generally  MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1, at 157-59.
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financing and asset securitization to accomplish two principal goals:  borrow money while
keeping debt off the books, and enable Enron to book the long-term value of a deal immediately
under mark-to-market accounting rules.170  Significantly, Fastow’s corporate finance department
set up transactions to milk them for beneficial accounting treatment — in terms of the
substantive economics of the business, they did nothing at all.  This observation will be crucial to
evaluating the duties of the lawyers who were employed to provide the documentation for the
transactions.  
Many of the Fastow transactions have become well known by names such as Chewco,
LJM1 and LJM2, and the Raptors.  These names refer to special purpose entities (SPE’s) which
were set up as part of the deals.  Special purpose entities are often used in the process of asset
securitization, in which the owners of some asset convert a stream of income over time into
something that could be repackaged as a security and sold immediately to investors in the capital
markets.171  For example, a bank with many outstanding mortgage loans is entitled to receive
monthly payments over the life of those loans, but it may wish to convert those payments into a
lump sum in cash that it can use immediately.  To do so, it “bundles” the mortgages and transfers
them to an SPE, which issues tradable financial instruments (mortgage-backed securities),
offered to investors at a discount relative to the present value of the stream of payments.  The
172  MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note 1 , at 162-65.  
173  Eventually Enron employed so many SPE’s that it was impossible to find investors with capital
representing 3 percent of the valuation of all of the off-balance-sheet vehicles.  See MCLEAN &  ELKIND , supra  note
1, at 166, 189; Powers Report, supra  note 1, at 41 (“Chewco” partnership was created because Enron managers were
having a hard time finding outside investors to finance buyout of JEDI joint venture).
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investors make money because they paid less for the securities than the income over time is
worth.  The bank is happy because it has converted a formerly illiquid asset into cash.  The
investors in these transactions are often investment banks who deal with large corporations on a
regular basis, and in the case of Enron were subjected to a fair amount of bullying by Fastow.172 
The banks and other institutional investors would often contribute funds directly to an SPE
created for the deal, which in turn purchased the asset from its owner.  In all of these
transactions, the SPE is supposed to be independent of the seller of the assets, but to be deemed
independent, it actually need only have 3 percent of its equity owned by a party unaffiliated with
the seller.  (If the SPE is independent, it need not be “consolidated” — i.e. reported on the
financial statements of the company that transferred assets to the SPE.)  Thus, if Citibank or J.P.
Morgan contributed $3 million to an SPE and Enron contributed $97 million, Enron would be
permitted to transfer assets to the SPE and book the transaction as a bona fide sale to an
independent party.  This situation was very much preferable, from Enron’s perspective, to a $100
million loan from the bank, which would have had an adverse effect on Enron’s credit rating.  
Although the legal and accounting requirements for transactions with unconsolidated, off-
balance-sheet SPE’s are not terribly rigorous, Enron had a hard time complying even with
those.173  Or, to put it differently, Enron was not interested in consummating a genuine transfer of
assets to a truly independent entity.  Its motivation was rather to continue to realize the economic
174  Second Batson Report, supra  note 1 , at 36-39 (motivation for SPE transactions); M CLEAN &  ELKIND ,
supra  note 1 , at 368-69 (abuse of recurring vs. nonrecurring distinction); Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra  note ___, at
142-43 (legitimate use of off-balance sheet financing).
175  See generally  ACCOUNTING FOR TRANSFERS AND SERVICING OF FINAN CIAL ASSETS AND
EXTINGUISHM ENTS O F LIABILITY —  A  REPLACEM ENT O F FASB  STATEMENT NO . 125, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 140  (Financial Accounting Standards Bd. 2000).  Several reports prepared under the
supervision of the bankruptcy court provide useful summaries of the applicable financial accounting standards.  See,
e.g., Report of Harrison J. Goldin, The Court-Appointed Examiner in the Enron North America Bankruptcy
Proceeding, Respecting His Investigation of the Role of Certain Entities in Transactions Pertaining to Special
Purpose Entities (Nov. 14, 2003) [hereinafter , “Goldin SPE Report”] (available on-line from Enron Corp.: 
<http://www.enron.com/corp/por/supporting.html> (visited 6/29/04)).  For the relevant legal standards, see STEVEN
L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE:  A  GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION  (2d ed. 1993); Second
Batson Report, supra  note 1 , App. C. 
176  Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra  note ___, at 135.
177  Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 14; Second Batson Report, supra  note 1, App. C, at 9-11 Schwarcz,
Alchemy, supra  note ___, at 141; Bratton, Dark Side, supra  note 1, at 1306-07 (citing numerous GAAP authorities).
178  Second Batson Report, supra  note 1 , at 37-38.  
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benefits of owning the asset, preferably as operating income as opposed to a one-time profits, but
move any debt associated with the acquisition of the asset off its balance sheet.174  In order to
accomplish this goal, Enron officers and employees, with the assistance of accountants and
lawyers, attempted to structure transactions that conformed to the letter of financial accounting
rules, while aggressively pushing the boundaries of permissibility.  To return to the image which
opened this Article, the lawyers and accountants were directed to create a duck, even though the
transactions (in more than one sense!) were a dog.  The duck-creating rules for SPE transactions
can be summarized very briefly as follows175:  
C The SPE must be “bankruptcy remote” from the originating company (e.g. Enron), so that
the originating company’s credit risks do not affect the risks associated with owning the
securities of the SPE.176  
C Bankruptcy remoteness depends, in turn, on the genuine transfer of the economic risks
and benefits associated with the assets from the originating company to the SPE.177  In
other words, the transfer must be a “true sale.”178  
179  Powers Report, supra  note 1, at 38-39 (consolidation is a presumptive requirement, and the presumption
can be overcome only if two conditions are met, namely independence of ownership and control of the SPE).
180  Bratton, Dark Side, supra  note 1, at 1306 n.118 (citing SEC and GAAP authorities for the three-percent
rule, and  noting that while the SEC has consistently denied that the three-percent rule is a bright-line test, it is
generally understood as such by accountants) .  
181  Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 36-37; Second Batson Report, supra  note 1, App. C, at 12-13, 20-23;
Schwarcz, Alchemy, supra  note ___, at 136; Christine E. Earley, et al., Some Thoughts on the Audit Failure at
Enron, the Demise of Arthur Andersen, and the Ethical Climate of Public Accounting Firms, 35 CONN. L. REV.
1013, 1019-20 (2003) (detailing side agreement between Enron and M ichael Kopper, an Enron employee whose
involvement need not be disclosed as a related-party transaction, guaranteeing loan from Barclay’s Bank to Kopper,
for the purpose of acquiring a three-percent interest in Chewco, an SPE run by Andy Fastow).  Enron used complex
financial devices, such as a transaction it called a Total Return Swap, to retain the benefits of an asset transferred to
an SPE.  Second Batson Report, supra  note 1, App. C, at 16-18.
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C If the SPE is not truly independent (i.e. bankruptcy remote) from the originating
company, the assets and liabilities of the SPE must be consolidated on the financial
statements of the originating company.179  Fleshing out the requirement of independent
ownership, financial accounting standards set a minimum of 3% for the equity that must
be contributed by entities unaffiliated with the originating company.180  
C The independence of an SPE can be compromised by the originating company retaining
conrol over the asset; this can be accomplished through side deals, such as loan
guarantees, between the originating company and the SPE, and may be shown by the
originating company’s attempt to recognize gains in the value of the SPE as earnings on
its own balance sheet.181 
Notice, however, that these norms are subject to manipulation or gaming by lawyers who
may be motivated to comply with them only formally.  A complete analysis of the
appropriateness of the Enron transactions would have to give additional content to those rules by
tapping into the understandings of the relevant interpretive community, which are germane to the
exercise of interpretive judgment by lawyers and accountants.  These principles are relevant to
interpretation, and can constrain the exercise of judgment, but only if the lawyer engaged in the
process of interpretation belongs to a community that is interested in maintaining a stable,
publicly accessible framework for cooperative activity.  A lawyer who belongs to Andy Fastow’s
182  Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note 1, at 1315.
183  See, e.g., Powers Report, supra  note 1 , at 192 ; Bratton, Dark Side, supra  note 1, at 1281 (calling
financial statements “famously opaque”).  The reaction of James Chanos, a sophisticated Wall Street hedge fund
manager, is typical:  “We read the footnotes in Enron’s financial statements about these transactions over and over
again, and . . . we could not decipher what impact they had on Enron’s overall financial condition.”  Chanos, supra
note ___, at 73.  Indeed, the complexity of some of the SPE transactions, such as the “Raptor” hedges, made it
difficult even for internal Enron managers to know how a given business unit was performing.  See Baird &
Rasmussen, supra  note 1, at 1802-04.
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interpretive community might be interested only in securing short-term economic benefits for her
client or, worse, for an individual agent of her client.  As I have argued, however, this
interpretive stance cannot be given a normative justification that reaches all the way down to the
bedrock of the social function of the law.  If, on the other hand, a lawyer is interested in
exercising judgment in a way that has plausible ethical foundations, she will probably discover
that the interpretive community recognizes certain norms that differentiate artificially created
ducks from real ducks — that is, distinguishing between transactions that are motivated only by
the attempt to create accounting results and those that have a real economic substance.  In
addition to the rules for duck-ness, there are principles regulating interpretation that sort ducks
from dogs dressed up as ducks, including:  
C One of the benefits of SPE financing is “disintermediation,” or the reduction of
transaction costs by removing intermediaries such as banks from the financing process.  A
transaction involving multiple intermediaries and a highly complex series of steps is
unlikely to result in the transaction cost savings that usually justifies SPE transactions.182
C Because SPE transactions can benefit both the originating company and investors in the
SPE, one would expect a legitimate transaction to be fully disclosed in a sufficiently clear
manner.  One of the recurring themes of the commentary on the Enron transactions is the
opacity of the disclosures.183  An undisclosed transaction or one that is camouflaged in
layers of obfuscating legalese, should alert lawyers and accountants that something is
184  I take the point that some structured finance transactions can be so complex that disclosure is necessarily
imperfect —  either it oversimplifies the transaction or it provides so much detail that it goes over the head of most
investors.  See Schwarcz, Use and Abuse , supra  note 1, at 1316-17.  When a transaction becomes this complicated,
the clarity of the disclosure language, by itself, is an insufficient indication of abuse.  In a case like this, however,
professionals have a heightened obligation of inquiry and should rely even more heavily on other factors to guide
their interpretation of the relevant legal and  accounting standards.  
185  Bratton, Dark Side, supra  note 1 , at 1314-15.  
186  Second Batson Report, supra  note 1, at 15.
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fishy.184  
C Additional caution is warranted when other aspects of the transaction are aggressive.  For
example, in the LJM transactions, Enron capitalized the SPE’s with $1.2 billion of its
own common stock, in exchange for notes issued by the SPE’s.  This is a once-disfavored
funding mechanism, and GAAP requires that Enron reduce shareholder equity in the
amount of the newly issued shares, until the SPE pays down the notes.185  Use of this kind
of capitalization scheme, and the failure of Enron to account for the transaction properly,
should have put professionals on notice that other aspects of the transaction should be
scrutinized carefully.  
C The financial accounting system in general is intended to provide transparent, accurate,
easily understood information to managers, creditors, and investors regarding the
financial condition of the reporting company.186  If it appears that managers are valuing
complexity for its own sake, it could be a red flag warning lawyers and accountants that
the transaction is intended to manipulate the numbers on the company’s financial
statements, rather than accomplish some economically useful end.  
Like the disciplining rules that differentiate between legitimate structuring to capture
favorable tax treatment, on the one hand, and bogus tax shelters on the other, these principles of
interpretation are not binary, all-or-nothing rules.  There is no algorithmic way to capture the
process of reasoning from these principles to a correct application of the law to an SPE
transaction.  For this reason, there may be hard cases in which competent lawyers disagree over
whether a given transaction is permissible, and there may be cases in which some lawyers are
more aggressive than others in pushing the boundaries of the rules.  This is as it should be.  To
187  Cf. Roman L. Weil, Testimony, Fundamental Causes of the Accounting Debacle at Enron:  Show Me
Where It Says I Can’t, HOUSE ENERGY AND COMM ERCE COMM ITTEE HEARING (Feb. 6, 2002), available at
<http://gsb.uchicago.edu/pdf/weil_testimony.pdf> (visited 7/16/04).
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emphasize, my claim is not that the appropriately constrained judgment of interpretive
communities produces a single right answer in every case.  Rather, the limit on lawyers’
creativity, preventing it from shading over into undue aggressiveness, is the requirement of
public justifiability.  A lawyer must be prepared, in principle, to articulate a reason why the legal
treatment (for tax, accounting, bankruptcy, etc., purposes) of a transaction is legitimate, in light
of the end sought to be advanced by the regulatory regime in question.  In the case of the Enron
SPE transactions reviewed in the Powers and Batson reports, there is simply no plausible
justification available.  Fastow and his confederates had manipulated the techniques of structured
financing to produce spurious accounting results which had no relationship whatsoever to the
underlying economics of the transactions.  Their abuse was abetted by the Holmesian bad man
attitudes of lawyers and accountants, who in effect agreed with Fastow that if the rules do not
explicitly say that something may not be done, it is permissible.  As this Article has argued,
however, interpreting the law correctly requires an approach very different from asking, “Show
me where it says I can’t do that.”187  
